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“Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God 
the things that are God’s.”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
For well over two thousand years, Western civilization has made a judgment that 
the mentally ill suffer not only from an illness, but also from a social condition.3  Nor 
has it been alone in this judgment; indeed, this view is almost uniform throughout the 
world.4  The result of this judgment is that the mentally ill have for a long time been 
held not responsible for their actions, be they of a civil or criminal nature.5  Certain 
problems accompany such a decision.  Society needs to distinguish the severely 
mentally ill, from those who may be ill but not severely.  A decision needs to be 
made about what to do with the mentally ill, in lieu of legal liability.  Society has 
grappled with these questions for generations, with each generation purportedly 
giving a more progressive and humane answer.   
As the science of medicine in general and of psychiatry6 in particular has 
developed, the criminal justice system has attempted to harvest the increased 
scientific knowledge so that it could help in answering these questions (although it 
has remained somewhat ambivalent about psychiatric involvement).7  Psychiatrists 
are now closely involved in multiple stages of criminal justice administration.8  Such 
involvement has quite often been lauded as it is perceived to be scientific, and thus 
objective, ridding the criminal justice system of arbitrariness and uncertainty in its 
                                                                
2Matthew 22:21 (American Standard).   
3See generally, JUDITH NEAMAN, SUGGESTIONS OF THE DEVIL: INSANITY IN THE MIDDLE 
AGES AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Anchor ed.  1975). 
4For example, Chinese law also allowed the mentally ill to escape punishment for their 
criminal acts.  See, e.g., Robin Munro, Judicial Psychiatry in China and its Abuses, 14 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 15-18 (2000).   
5See NEAMAN, supra note 2, at 67-68. 
6Throughout this article, for the sake of brevity and consistency the term “psychiatry” or 
“psychiatrist” is used; however, it is meant to encompass all mental health professionals. 
7See Michael L.  Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity 
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 674 (1989/1990) (“This tragic 
ambivalence is reflected in judicial desires to have mental health experts testify as to future 
dangerousness, an expertise which psychiatrists themselves freely acknowledge they do not 
have, and to have them “take the weight” on difficult decisions involving commitment or 
release, especially in the cases of individuals hospitalized following insanity acquittals”). 
8For a general discussion on the rules and stages of psychiatric involvement in criminal 
justice system see WAYNE R.  LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (3rd ed.) 363-391 (2000); see also 
ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967). 
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involvement with the criminally insane.9  Today psychiatrists are involved in every 
stage of the criminal process, from the preliminary hearing to long after conviction 
or acquittal by reason of insanity.10  Because of their undisputed expertise in mental 
health, some of the judgments that psychiatrists make go unquestioned by the 
criminal justice system.11  When such judgments are questioned however, a “battle of 
the experts” ensues12 where the scientific truth gets lost.13  Psychiatrists are often 
asked to testify on issues that they have no particular expertise in.  A psychiatrist 
cannot intelligently answer whether the accused poses future danger, yet such 
questions are routinely asked.  A psychiatrist also has no specialized knowledge to 
answer such questions of morality as “did the person know ‘right from wrong’ or 
‘good from evil.’”  However, the courts do tend to allow psychiatrists to offer 
testimony on such essentially moral questions.  Thus, psychiatrists are tempted to 
justify the judgments of the courts or alternatively to substitute their own morality 
for that of the rest of the society (as expressed by the jury).  Such intertwining of 
medicine and the law does not do justice, and reflects poorly on the medical 
profession.  The “battle of the experts” and the resultant and concomitant distrust 
that lay juries often end up having in experts14 are but a symptom of this problem.  
This article argues that despite the benefits of ridding the criminal justice system of 
some uncertainty and ignorance with respect to mental health issues, the very close 
involvement of psychiatrists in the criminal justice system as practiced in the United 
States is not only illogical and bad policy, but also unethical from the viewpoint of 
medical ethics. 
Part II of this article will lay the groundwork for the argument by discussing the 
history of the insanity defense, and of science’s involvement with criminal justice; 
while Part III, will look into the association of science and the administration of 
justice in the modern world.  Part IV will argue that the alternative methods of 
linking psychiatry and the criminal justice system, such as independent expert 
panels, do not solve the fundamental problem of psychiatrists working beyond their 
ethical boundaries.  Finally, Part V will focus on the ethical principles that should 
guide a psychiatrist in his involvement with the judiciary.      
                                                                
9See, e.g., CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PSYCHIATRIC TESTIMONY, COMMITTEE ON 
PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW, GROUP FOR ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY (May 1954) in BY 
REASON OF INSANITY (Lawrence Z. Freedman ed. 1983) 12 (stating that psychiatric testimony 
is “in the interest of a comprehensive criminal justice.”) 
10See generally LAFAVE, supra note 8; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8. 
11See generally LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 368. 
12See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 134. 
13Henry Weihofen, Eliminating the Battle of the Experts in Criminal Insanity Cases, 48 
MICH. L. REV. 961, 962 (1950).  (Hereinafter Battle of the Experts). 
14See id. at 967.  (Suggesting that juries tend to disbelieve “experts” if they also have an 
access to “independent” opinion.)  
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II.  INSANITY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
A.  Why Absolve the “Lunatics?” 
The mentally ill and feeble minded have for a long time been treated differently 
in the law.15  This legal distinction can be traced as far back as the Roman Empire 
Law.16  This exception from criminal responsibility survived through the ages to the 
present day.  This section of the article will attempt to articulate a variety of policy 
and ethical reasons as to why the mentally ill have enjoyed and continue to enjoy an 
exemption from criminal responsibility. 
Any reason to exclude a group of people from punishment for certain acts must 
rest in the reasons and theory underlying punishment itself.17 Thus, when one looks 
at various reasons for punishment advanced throughout the ages, one will have a 
better understanding of why the mentally ill were often not subject to the full range 
thereof. 
Several classic theories for punishment have been advanced throughout the years.  
None of these theories however can be applied to the insane.  As no theory of 
punishment fits them, it must follow that punishment is not to apply to the mad. 
One theory for why society punishes wayward individuals is to prevent these 
same individuals from inflicting further harm upon the society.18 This is best 
understood as specific deterrence.  In essence this theory is very Pavlovian19 in its 
nature.  By subjecting a violator to negative experiences, the society hopes to elicit 
an understanding that further rule-breaking will lead to more negative experiences, 
while following the rules will result in positive experiences.20 However, this 
mechanism cannot succeed merely on the “stimulus-response” axis.  Some 
understanding of events surrounding the punishment and of the punishment itself 
must occur in order for this theory to be effective.21 
Another theory of punishment is rehabilitation of the wayward members of 
society.22  The offenders are incarcerated not just to make them safe,23 but also more 
productive members of society.24  Of course, penance requires that one understands 
                                                                
15See generally Perlin, supra note 7; see also NEAMAN, supra note 2. 
16See NEAMAN, supra note 3, at 69. 
17The major underlying reason for administering punishment on an individual basis is a 
belief in personal responsibility.  See Francis B. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV.L.REV. 974 
(1932). 
18See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 12-13. 
19A famous experiment by a Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov showed that a dog can be 
conditioned to exhibit a physiological response based on an unrelated stimulus that is paired 
with a stimulus that naturally causes the said physiological response.   
20See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 12. 
21Id.  at 12-13. 
22LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 326. 
23MICHAEL MOORE, LAW & PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 234 (1984). 
24Id. 
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that his actions are wrong, and more importantly, that he has the ability to act 
“right.”25  
Oftentimes, the desire to educate society on the principles of right and wrong 
drives the criminal justice system.26 Two theories are at work.  One is that the very 
process of apprehending, prosecuting and punishing the culprit serves to educate the 
rest of society as to the prohibited type of conduct, especially as the laws and 
regulations proliferate at such rate that few individuals can keep pace.27 The other is 
that punishment (by being an unpleasant experience) deters other members of society 
from engaging in unpalatable conduct.28 By punishing individuals, society 
affirmatively tells everyone that certain behavior is wrong, and showcases what 
awaits those who do not heed societal prohibitions.29 
The oldest theory of punishment is the one of “just deserts.”30 It is aimed directly 
at the culprit and is based on the idea that the suffering inherent in any punishment is 
deserved.31  Through punishment, society exacts its vengeance on those who choose 
to disregard its rules.32  The pain that the punishment inflicts on the criminal is in 
return for the pain that the criminal inflicts on society through his own freely chosen 
wrongful actions.33  
Finally, punishment is also inflicted to incapacitate the offender, i.e., to place him 
in such a surrounding where he can commit no more crimes.34  (This of course 
discounts the possibility of crime “on the inside,” but even with this factor accounted 
for, it is undeniable that a person against whom strict control is exercised is not able 
to cause as much damage as he would otherwise be able to do.)35  Prison 
incapacitates dangerous criminals and the society therefore justifiably feels safer.36 
                                                                
25This follows from the underlying premise of the theory that when causes of bad behavior 
are removed, the delinquent will act right.  LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 24.  Incarceration, 
irrespective of the amount of training for the new life that it provides, simply cannot cure a 
medical condition, so the insane even with the new skills the insane will not be able to act 
“right.”  Cf. Helen H. Stern, Madness in the Criminal Law, 40 TEMPLE L.Q. 348, 360 (1967). 
26FRANKLIN ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 4 (1971). 
27HEINRICH OPPENHEIMER, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 293-94 (1913). 
28ZIMRING, supra note 26, at 3. 
29Id.   
30Sometimes it is referred to as retribution or revenge or retaliation.  LAFAVE, supra note 
7, at 26. 
31IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie tr. 1887) 
32See JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883). 
33See MICHAEL S. MOORE, THE MORAL WORTH OF RETRIBUTION IN RESPONSIBILITY 
CHARACTER AND EMOTIONS (F.  Shoeman, ed.) 179 (1987). 
34LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 24. 
35Ledger Wood, Responsibility and Punishment, 28 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 630, 639 
(1939). 
36John J. Diulio, Jr., Prisons are a Bargain, By Any Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996 at 
A17. 
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The mentally ill are not subject to the punishments meted out by the criminal 
justice system for a variety of reasons.  Some, such as “specific deterrence”37 and 
“rehabilitation,”38 have to do with the fact that mentally ill cannot understand the 
nature of punishment anymore than they can understand the nature of the crime,39 
and the significance of punishment is therefore lost on them.40 Some, such as 
“education”41 or “deterrence”42 theories have to do with the benefits that inure to the 
public from such exculpation; because by exculpating the mentally ill, the “right” 
and “wrong” are brought into focus more clearly.43  Yet other rationales come from 
policy reasons that caution against equating a lunatic with a sinister criminal, 
accordingly making “retribution” inappropriate.44  Although restraint may seem 
applicable to both sane and insane,45 the incapacitation of the insane cannot be 
viewed as punishment, for they are not merely incapacitated, but treated.46 
Underlying it all, however, is a moral judgment that the mentally ill are not 
sufficiently “bad” to warrant the condemnation inherent in conviction and criminal 
sanction.47  Since “insanity” (and thus lack of responsibility) is a moral view on the 
part of society, the actions of those involved in the process of separating out the 
“bad” from the “insane” should conform to that underlying judgment. 
B.  Science and the Law 
Psychiatry was involved in criminal justice at least as far back as the Middle 
Ages.48  The two professions that dealt with mental illness at that time (i.e., clergy 
and physicians) came into contact with the criminal justice system because the law of 
the times allowed both “idiots”49 and “lunatics”50 to be exempted from punishment.51 
                                                                
37The insane cannot be deterred by punishment because as a result of mental illness they 
do not respond as expected to societal stimuli.  See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 13. 
38See supra note 33 and the accompanying text. 
39GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 13. 
40Id. 
41Punishing people who are not viewed to be “blameworthy” does not educate anyone on 
anything, instead it blurs distinctions between culpable, and non-culpable conduct.  LAFAVE, 
supra note 8, at 326. 
42One is not deterred if he cannot identify with the situation of the criminal.  As most 
individuals cannot identify with the mentally ill, the punishment does not deter.  GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 8, at 13. 
43See supra note 40. 
44GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 12. 
45LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 326. 
46Id. at 382. 
47See The Insanity Defense: ABA and APA Proposals for Change, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY 
REP. 136, 141 (1983).   
48See generally NEAMAN, supra note 2. 
49Idiocy was considered to be an inborn and hereditary condition, akin to what today 
would be called mental retardation.  Idiots could never achieve normalcy, and therefore never 
had either rights or responsibilities commensurate with that of the rest of the citizenry.  See 
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Thus a differentiation between those who were sufficiently ill to qualify and those 
who were not was necessary.52  The definition of an “idiot” was  
[A] person who cannot account or number twenty pence, nor can tell who 
was his father or mother, nor how old he is, etc., so as it may appear he 
hath no understanding of reason what shall be for his profit, or what for 
his loss.  But if he have such understanding that he know and understand 
his letters, and do read by teaching of another man, then it seems he is not 
a sot or natural fool.53  
Lunatics on the other hand were defined as persons who suffered from an 
imbalance of humours.54  Idiots were completely free from criminal responsibility 
throughout their lives as they were seen as ever unable to reason and thus form 
intent.55  Lunatics on the other hand were free from the responsibility only during the 
period of raving lunacy, and had to carry all the legal burdens during the periods of 
clarity.56  An assessment thus needed to be made whether the person was currently 
suffering from a disorder or was in his lucid interval.57  Medical professionals were 
used to evaluate those whose sanity or other mental faculties were in question,58 yet 
the credence they were given did not arise out of the respect for their training or 
degrees, but rather because the juries believed that they were in a position to closely 
observe the defendant and thus best able to describe his condition.59  Thus, although 
medical opinion could be offered, it rarely was, and when it was, although 
considered useful, it was not given greater weight than layperson’s testimony.  This 
changed greatly with the arrival of the 19th century. 
                                                          
JOHN BRYDALL, NON COMPOS MENTIS, OR THE LAW RELATING TO NATURAL FOOLS, MADFOLK, 
AND LUNATICK PERSONS, INQUISITED, AND EXPLAINED FOR COMMON BENEFIT 6 (1700). 
50Lunacy, unlike idiocy, was not considered to be either inborn or hereditary.  A lunatic 
could have moments of “clarity” whereupon all rights and responsibilities of a citizen would 
devolve upon him (until the relapse).  See id. at 94; see also HENRICI DI BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS 
ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE [ON LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND] 321 (Travers Twiss, ed. 
& trans., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1990) (1250). 
51See NEAMAN, supra note 2.  (The law cared not about the diagnosis, but whether the 
defendant could behave in accordance with the law). 
52See id.   
53ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, NATURA BREVUM 579 (1534). 
54See NEAMAN, supra note 2. 
55See BRYDALL, supra  note 49, at 12. 
56Id. at 110. 
57NEAMAN, supra note 2, at 77. 
58Id. at 68-69. 
59See Fran R. Freemon, The Origin of Medical Expert Witness, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 349 
(2001). 
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Perhaps the most well documented case (prior to modern times) of expert 
medical testimony in support of mental illness occurred in 180060 at the trial of 
James Hadfield.61  Mr. Hadfield was accused of attempting to assassinate the King of 
England,62 a charge of high treason, punishable by death.63  Hadfield previously 
served as a dragoon in an Anglo-French war,64 where he sustained severe injuries to 
the head,65 to the point that the membrane of his brain was visible.66  His most able 
counselor, Hon. Thomas Erskine,67 made the most of the insanity defense.68  In 
addition to several lay witnesses who testified as to Hadfield’s erratic behavior,69 
Erskine called three different physicians to the stand.70  Mr. Henry Cline, an eminent 
surgeon, testified that wounds sustained to the head during the war were sufficient to 
cause brain damage.71 Next, Doctor Creighton testified that the Hadfield suffered 
from delusions;72 that “he was ordained to die as Jesus Christ.”73  Finally, Mr. 
Lidderdale,74 another surgeon, testified that the insanity served as a cause of the 
discharge from the army.75 
                                                                
60Although there were insanity defenses and acquittals before that time, this trial is one of 
the few that occurred quite a long time ago, and yet is very well documented.  Furthermore, 
even though there were such pleas and acquittals, up until 1740 they were quite few in 
number, and perhaps this contributed to lack of documentation.  See Richard Moran, The 
Origin of Insanity as a Special Verdict: The Trial for Treason of James Hadfield (1800), 19 
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 487, 488 (1985).  Furthermore, it must be noted that juries relied mostly on 
their personal understanding of sanity and insanity, and although medical experts testified 
their testimony was given no more or less credence than testimony of any other person.  
Freemon, supra note 58, at 349. 
61Trial of James Hadfield For High Treason, 27 Howell’s English State Trials 1281 (K.B. 
1800).   
62Id. at 1283. 
63Moran, supra note 60, at 496-497. 
6427 How. St. Tr. at 1330. 
65Id.  
66Moran, supra note 60, at 504. 
6727 How. St. Tr. at 1281. 
68See Moran, supra note 59, at 502-08.    
69See 27 How. St. Tr. 1330-56. 
70See id. at 1332-36.   
71Id. at 1332-33. 
72Id. at 1334. 
73
 Id. at 1335. 
74Mr. Lidderdale was an army surgeon with the 15th Light Dragoon Regiment, the same 
one that Hadfield served in. 27 How. St. Tr. at 1135. 
75Id. at 1335-36. 
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At the time of James Hadfield’s trial though, juries were thought to put little 
stock in the medical testimony76 and instead relied on the testimony of lay people, 
such as friends or acquaintances.77  The trial helped to start a process of changing 
these attitudes.  The testimony of a psychiatrist is now considered to be most 
useful,78 although general physicians (especially if they have been treating the 
defendant for some period of time) also offer testimony.79  It has been noted that 
juries tend to believe “independent” (i.e., court-appointed) experts more than an 
expert for any particular side.80  
Although medical professionals are generally held in higher esteem then before,81 
some juries have disregarded medical testimony to find defendants sane on the basis 
of lay testimony when such testimony contradicted that of a psychiatrist.82  Courts 
have upheld such verdicts.83  It is the contention of this article that the juries 
disregard professional testimony84 because such testimony has fallen into disrepute 
due to the very nature of “battling experts.”85  When psychiatrists are allowed to 
testify on issues beyond their competence (e.g., morals, dangerousness) their 
testimony ceases to be legitimate expert testimony.  The contention is that if 
psychiatry is to keep its legitimate place within the criminal justice system, it must 
be nothing more than an objective evaluator of medical information, and leave the 
determination of moral culpability to non-physicians.  Both policy and medical 
ethics call for such a result. 
C.  Various Judicial Tests for Insanity. 
Mental illness, however defined, has for a very long time been viewed as an 
exculpatory answer to a charge of crime.86  Almost eight hundred years ago Lord 
Bracton announced the principle that people who do not know what they are doing, 
                                                                
76See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.   
77Moran, supra note 60, at 506. 
78LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 378. 
79See, e.g., State v. Armant, 719 So.2d 510 (La. App. 1998); Holt v. State, 181 P.2d 573 
(Okl. App. 1947).  But see State v. Doiron 90 So. 920 (La. 1922) (holding that a physician, 
who had no knowledge or experience with mental diseases or insane persons, was not 
competent to testify as an expert on insanity).   
80See Weihofen, Battle of the Experts, supra note 13, at 966-67. 
81See supra notes 58-59 and 75 and accompanying text. 
82Scott E. Sundby, The Jury As Critic: Empirical Look at How Juries Perceive Expert and 
Lay Testimony, 83 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1997). 
83E.g., State v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306 (Conn. 1987); Montano v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1042 
(Ind. 1984); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 
402 A.2d 995 (Pa. 1979). 
84See supra, note 82 and accompanying text. 
85Jurors tend to view conflicting experts as essentially canceling each other out, thus 
negating the very benefits that experts are supposed to provide.  See Sundby, supra note 82, at 
1138-39.   
86See supra, notes 4 and 14-15 and accompanying text. 
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cannot be held responsible for their actions.87  The premise of the “ability to discern 
between good and evil”88 test for criminal responsibility rested on a notion that 
children under the age of seven, (i.e., under the “age of reason”) cannot be held 
responsible for their actions.89  So too, the courts of the time reasoned, if a man is 
like a child who cannot tell a difference, he too cannot be held responsible for his 
actions.90  The test for what constitutes sufficient affliction to be held not criminally 
responsible has changed, but the basic proposition that at least some of the mentally 
ill should not be dealt with within the bounds of the criminal justice system has 
remained largely unchanged.91 
Since Lord Bracton’s original pronouncement on what will suffice to have a 
person adjudged not responsible for his action, the common law tried several 
different approaches to identify those that are sufficiently ill to escape criminal 
punishment.92  For example, in Rex v. Arnold,93 Justice Tracy instructed the jury to 
acquit the defendant if they found that he was “a man that is totally deprived of his 
understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an 
infant, or a wild beast, or a brute, [for] such a one is never the object of 
punishment.”94  One can conclude from such a definition that the underlying idea 
under the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity acquittal was total deprivation of 
senses.95  While medical professionals could be used in such a circumstance, such 
complete “lunacy” should have been evident even without medical testimony.  As 
described above, this “complete madness”96 notion was successfully challenged by 
Thomas Erskine in the trial of James Hadfield,97 and so the involvement of medical 
professionals became more pronounced.98 
                                                                
87BRACTON, supra note 50, at 321. 
88See Perlin, supra note 7, at n. 140. 
89Id. 
90See NIGEL WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 28-29 (1973). 
91See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding the execution of mentally 
retarded unconstitutional); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding unconstitutional 
the execution of the insane); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3596(c) (exempting the mentally retarded 
from death penalty); Ga. Code Ann. § 17-7-131(j) (same); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 400.27 
(same). 
92See Perlin¸ supra note 7, at 631-40. 
9316 How. St. Tr. 695 (1724). 
94Id. 
95Raymond L. Spring, Farewell to Insanity: A Return to Mens Rea, 66-MAY J. KAN. B. 
ASS’N. 38, 39 (1997). 
96The “right and wrong” or “wild beast” tests were in essence “all-or-none.” If a person 
could exhibit some reason no matter how small, he would generally be considered competent.  
See Brydall, supra note 49, at 8 (stating that if a person can name the days of the week or 
count to twenty, or know his age or know who his parents are, he is not an “idiot.”).   
97See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text. 
98See supra note 60. 
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A new test was announced after deliberation in the House of Lords, subsequent to 
an acquittal of Daniel M’Naghten of the charge of treason.99  The M’Naghten test 
also specifically made “disease or defect of mind” a prerequisite to an insanity 
acquittal, rather than just a general “wild beast” state.100  Additionally, their lordships 
stated that in order to be acquitted, one “labouring under such a defect of reason, 
from disease of the mind, [did] not … know the nature and quality of the act he was 
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.”101  
Thus, mental illness was necessary, but insufficient for the acquittal.  In so deciding 
a case, the House of Lords virtually assured that science and medicine would stay 
involved with the law.   
The M’Naghten test survived for a very long time102 and in many jurisdictions is 
still in use today.103  The major (albeit brief) departure and expansion of the 
availability of the insanity defense came in 1954, when the D.C. Circuit handed 
down its decision in Durham v. United States.104  The Durham court held it to be 
irrelevant whether defendant knew right from wrong,105 and instead relied on a 
“product test.”106  The court stated that the accused is not to be held criminally liable 
if his criminal act was a “product of mental disease or defect.”107  Durham was the 
high point of involving science in the criminal adjudication, in the sense that it called 
for the jury to hear all pertinent medical testimony on mental disease.108  However, 
the court did not subscribe to the notion that the presence of mental disease or 
psychiatric testimony would serve as a final determination of sanity.109  Indeed, one 
of the reasons the D.C. Circuit adopted the new rule was to separate scientific 
determinations from the legal ones.110  The court stated that the “[j]uries will 
continue to make moral judgments, still operating under the fundamental precept that 
‘Our collective conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose 
blame,’”111 while not focusing exclusively on “whether he displayed particular 
                                                                
99M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
100Id at 722. 
101Id. 
102Indeed the first wholesale revision occurred in 1954 when a new legal test for insanity 
was proposed.  See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.  It must be said though that in 
1929 in Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (1929), the D.C. Circuit added “irresistible 
impulse” as an additional excuse.   
103See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. 
104214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by U. S. v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981 
(D.C.Cir. 1972). 
105214 F.2d at 872. 
106Id. at 874-75. 
107Id. 
108See id. at 875. 
109See id.   
110Id. at 876. 
111Id. 
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symptoms which medical science has long recognized do not necessarily, or even 
typically, accompany even the most serious mental disorder.”112  
Durham was abandoned in 1972.113  Today many states continue to follow the 
M’Naghten test or the American Legal Institute (ALI) test.114  (There was a trend 
away from the ALI test back to M’Naghten following the NGRI acquittal of John 
Hinckley.)115  The ALI test is centered on whether or not the defendant lacked 
“substantial capacity” to “appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.”116  The ALI test, although at 
first glance is quite similar to the M’Naghten rule, answers one of the main criticisms 
of M’Naghten,117 insofar as it does not rely as heavily on actually “knowing right 
from wrong,”118 instead focusing on the “capacity”119 to make that distinction.  The 
main criticism of this test has been that the words “substantial capacity” are not 
defined, thus potentially causing confusion in the experts and the juries.120  
Differences among experts that result from the lack of precision of the ALI rule are 
likely to lead to the “battle” of these experts, perhaps confusing the jury even 
further.121  
Throughout time, many different definitions of criminal insanity have been 
tried,122 yet a perfect one has yet to be found.  Some, like the ALI test, are deemed to 
be too imprecise,123 some like M’Naghten, too rigid.124  Yet, irrespective of what test 
a modern jurisdiction uses, they rely on the help of psychiatrists in verifying that for 
                                                                
112214 F.2d at 876. 
113U. S. v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981 (D.C.Cir. 1972). 
114For example, the United States follow M’Naghten rule, 18 U.S.C. § 20, while many 
states have adopted the ALI Model Penal Code definitions either by statute or court decision.  
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 383 N.E.2d 1115 (Mass. 1978); State v. Johnson, 399 
A.2d 469 (R.I. 1979); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977); State v. Grimm 195 
S.E.2d 637 (W.Va.  1973).  See also, John Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense 
Standards on Juror Decision Making, 15 L. & HUMAN BEH. 509, 510 (1991). 
115See Valerie P. Hans & Dan Slater, John W. Hinckley, Jr. & the Insanity Defense: The 
Public Verdict, 47 PUB. OPINION Q. 202 (1983).   
116MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01. 
117The Model Penal Code stated that the  whether defendant had “knowledge” of right and 
wrong cannot be answered by science, and is better left to the province of theologians and 
philosophers.  Id., § 4.01, Appendix A (1985).   
118M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). 
119MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1). 
120See, e.g., Richard H. Kuh, The Insanity Defense-An Effort to Combine Law and Reason, 
110 U. PA. L. REV.  771, 797-99 (1962). 
121Cf. id. at 799. 
122See supra notes 87-121 and the accompanying text. 
123Of course some jurisdictions also deem it to be too lenient.  See supra note 114-15 and 
accompanying text. 
124See, e.g., Durham, 214 F.2d at 870-71.   
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the criminal justice purposes, the person in question is insane.125  To what degree 
such help should be used is the focus of this article. 
III.  PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE MODERN WORLD 
A.  Psychiatric Involvement Today 
The role of psychiatrist in today’s criminal justice system is varied and multi-
dimensional.126  Psychiatrists can get involved in any stage of the process, from the 
initial hearing determining competency to stand trial,127 to testifying at trial as to the 
mental state of the accused,128 to post-sentencing129 (or post-acquittal)130 treatment.  
The testimony of the psychiatrist can be based not only upon personal evaluation of 
the defendant,131 but also on such questionable techniques as evaluation of the other 
testimony in the case132 or even a hypothetical question propounded by counsel.133  
Needless to say, the testimony offered at these proceedings may not always be 
grounded in hard science.134  Additionally, at several stages of the process, the 
defendant may be entitled to his own (as opposed to the one working for the state) 
psychiatric expert witness.135  As can be expected, when one psychiatrist works for 
one side and another for a different side, the conclusions as to culpability do not 
                                                                
125See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
126See generally, M. Gregg Bloche, Psychiatry, Capital Punishment, and the Purposes of 
Medicine, 16 Int’l. J. L. & Psychiatry 301, 311-16 (1993) (hereinafter Psychiatry and Capital 
Punishment). 
127Id. at 311. 
128Id. at 312. 
129
 See id. at 314. 
130LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 382. 
131Weihofen, Battle of the Experts, supra note 13, at 277-78. 
132Id. at 279-80. 
133Id. at 280-83.  This technique, largely due to its inherent flaws, however is not 
frequently used.  LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 378. 
134See WILLIAM A. WHITE, INSANITY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 86 (1923); Weihofen, Battle 
of the Experts, supra note 13, at 283; L. Vernon Briggs, Medico-Legal Insanity and the 
Hypothetical Question 14 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 62 (1923).   
135Some states have statutes requiring the state to pay for the psychiatric defense of the 
indigents.  See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 n. 4 (1985).  In Ake, the Court recognized 
that psychiatric evaluation may be necessary for the defense to properly present its case and 
required states to provide a psychiatrist for that purpose.  Although the Court did not explicitly 
say that the psychiatrist must work exclusively for the defense (i.e., implying that prosecution 
and defense can “share”), the Court did recognize that psychiatrists disagree widely and 
frequently” on the issue of legal insanity.  This may imply that “sharing” will not work, as 
defense and prosecution will each seek out psychiatrists with differing points of view.  Id. at 
80-81.  Based on the foregoing some have concluded that a “partisan” expert is 
constitutionally required.  E.g., John M. West, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal 
Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1346 
(1986).    
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always coincide.136  A “battle of the experts” often ensues where the medical 
profession is at its worst, and the jury oftentimes disregards the testimony of both 
physicians in favor of the far less scientific lay testimony.137  While many argue that 
the “battle of the experts” is the disease afflicting the criminal justice system,138 this 
article argues that it is but a symptom of a larger problem, namely excessive 
entanglement between medicine and criminal law.   
Currently, psychiatric testimony is often unmoored from the hard psychiatric 
science, and ventures into the realm of law and morality.  This has caused some to 
argue in favor of abandoning the introduction of psychiatric testimony altogether.139  
On the other hand, psychiatric testimony is deemed to be quite useful in shedding 
light on the mental processes of the accused, causing some to argue for psychiatrists 
to be allowed to give their opinions on whether the accused could not “help himself” 
in committing a crime.140  Neither of these two extremes is appropriate.  Psychiatric 
testimony is indeed quite useful if one uses it to elucidate defendant’s mental health.  
However, such testimony is irrelevant if one is trying to affix responsibility.  It then 
follows that the testimony should be geared towards answering the first question.  In 
order to answer the question of defendant’s mental health, a psychiatrist needs to 
confine himself to issues of medical fact.  The testimony should resemble a 
conversation between two psychiatrists upon a transfer of the patient.  Thus issues 
like diagnosis, treatment, signs and symptoms would be covered (as well as 
reasoning for coming to a given conclusion) while issues of responsibility, morality 
and future dangerousness will be left for others to testify to and decide.  Testimony 
thus limited would revolve around medical issues, i.e., those on which physicians 
have a specialized knowledge.  Not only would such testimony be more scientifically 
sound,141 but also more ethically appropriate, as discussed in Part V.  This approach 
would allow the jury to hear testimony on issues that they may not be familiar with 
(i.e., different psychiatric syndromes, manifestations of disease, etc) from an expert, 
while precluding the expert from using his position to foist upon the jury his own 
moral judgments, an issue on which he is no more an expert than a given juror.   
The current level of actual psychiatric entanglement with the law is revealed 
below. 
                                                                
136See Ake, 407 U.S. at 81-82. 
137See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text. 
138E.g., Weihofen, Battle of the Experts, supra note 13; see also Thomas Mackey 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author). 
139See, e.g., MARGARET A.  HAGEN, WHORES OF THE COURT: THE FRAUD OF PSYCHIATRIC 
TESTIMONY AND THE RAPE OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (1997); see also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE 
ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP OUTS, SOB STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 38 
(1994) (calling psychiatric testimony “psychobabble”). 
140See, e.g., HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 286 (1954).  
(Hereinafter, CRIMINAL DEFENSE); Cf. People v. Jones, 266 P.2d 38 (Cal. 1954) (allowing 
psychiatric testimony on issue of defendant’s character because it can help in determining 
whether one was a “sexual deviant”). 
141See infra note 192 and accompanying text. 
2002-03] A HEALER OR AN EXECUTIONER? 183 
1.  Competency to Stand Trial 
At the earliest stage of the criminal proceedings, a psychiatrist can be used to 
evaluate the patient to see if he is “competent” to stand trial.142  Competency is not a 
medical term, but a legal one.143  A defendant is adjudged competent if “he has 
sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him.”144  A finding of incompetence halts 
all further proceedings indefinitely, until such time as competence can be regained.145  
Up until relatively recently, a person found to be incompetent to stand trial would be 
subject to a lifetime of commitment in a psychiatric institution in lieu of 
punishment.146  This practice was disapproved by the Supreme Court in Jackson v.  
Indiana.147  Today, a person found to be incompetent should be subject to 
hospitalization only for a period of time necessary to determine the likelihood of 
regaining competency.148  Indeed, hospitalization is not even required.149 The 
observation and evaluation of an incompetent person can be done on an outpatient 
basis.150  If at any point the psychiatrist believes that the defendant is able to meet the 
competency standard,151 he must file a report with a court that will adjudicate 
competence.152  In practice, such psychiatric determinations are almost always 
deferred to.153 
The evaluation is generally performed by a psychiatrist specifically designated by 
the court154 and is done in the psychiatrist’s office, court clinic, or jail.155  Often the 
                                                                
142Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 311; Jeffrey A. Wertkin, 
Competency to Stand Trial, 90 GEO. L. J. 1514, 1517 (2002). 
143Joanmarie I.  Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why Do Courts Continue to Rely 
on Antiquated Mental Illness Research? 69 TENN. L. REV. 987, 995-96 (2002). 
144Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).   
145See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 717 n. 1 (1972) (quoting Indiana statute dealing 
with incompetence to stand trial.  IND. CODE § 35-5-3-2 (1971)). 
146Indeed it is this procedure that gave rise to Jackson’s complaint.  Id. at 719. 
147406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
148Id. at 738.  Confinement however often does last significantly longer than the bare 
minimum required to make a judgment on the issue.  Nonetheless, essentially perpetual pre-
trial confinement is no longer practiced.   
149See LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 368. 
150See generally id. 
151See supra, note 106 and accompanying text. 
152See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 131-36. 
153See id. at 132. 
154LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 368. 
155Id. 
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examination occurs at a mental institution.156  In either case, the examination is done 
by a professional in government’s employ.157  The examining psychiatrist prepares a 
report of the examination for the court with copies for the prosecuting and defense 
counsel.158  A defendant may employ his own psychiatrist,159 but if a “battle of the 
experts” ensues as a result of divergent findings between the court-appointed 
“independent” expert, and the defendant-retained expert, the former is likely to be 
given more credence by the court.160 Because of the awesome power that the court-
appointed psychiatrist may have on the outcome of the case,161 the competing sides 
may use the psychiatric examination and testimony to their own maximum advantage 
regardless of the actual scientific underpinnings of such procedures.162 Some believe 
that even the court itself, presumably the most impartial player in the system, may 
utilize the process to avoid for example granting bail.163 Furthermore, there have 
been accusations that courts use the competency evaluations to justify what it wants 
to do with the defendant,164 and a psychiatrist may find himself used as a cover by 
the court or prosecuting attorney.165 
As competency is a legal standard and not a medical one,166 psychiatrists are torn 
between the desires to have their work correspond to the acceptable scientific 
standards on the one hand,167 and on the other hand to have the report fit within the 
                                                                
156See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV. 
921, 930 -32 (1985) (suggesting that the majority of evaluations are still done on inpatient 
basis); Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the 
Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
65, 71 n. 3 (1988).  But see W. Lawrence Fitch & Susan R. Steinberg, Competency to Stand 
Trial and Criminal Responsibility, 36-FEB. MD. B. J.14, 18 (2003) (stating that in Maryland 
defendants first undergo a “screening evaluation” and only if there are any questions after such 
evaluation, an inpatient observation is ordered).   
157GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 131. 
158Id. 131-36. 
159LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 372. 
160Weihofen, Battle of the Experts, supra note 13, at 967-68.    
161See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 132-33. 
162See C.R. JEFFERY, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL DISEASE 159 (1st 1967); 
LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 363 (“It is to the advantage of both prosecutor and the defense to 
have the defendant examined by a psychiatrist whose orientation and examination procedures 
are such as will probably support their side of the case.”); Cf. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 134 
(stating that psychiatrist’s own views on theory of psychiatry as a science play (or should 
play) an important role in him being selected or not selected as a witness for a given side.) 
163ABRAHAM L. HALPERN, USE AND MISUSE OF PSYCHIATRY IN COMPETENCY EXAMINATION 
OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS, IN PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS AND 
DEBATE 104 (Richard J. Bonnie ed. 1977). 
164Id. at 105. 
165Id. 
166Davoli, supra note 143, at 995-96.   
167See JUSTIN W. POLIER, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY 15 (1968). 
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legal framework of “incompetence.”168  A professional so “divided against himself” 
cannot for long maintain the high code of medical ethics and is prone to slip to a 
position where he becomes more than an impartial scientist or a healer, but an 
advocate for one side in a legal argument. 
2.  Testimony at Trial 
The second point at which psychiatrists get involved with the criminal justice 
system is at trial,169 testifying for either the defense or the prosecution as to the 
defendant’s culpability in his criminal act.170  The psychiatric testimony as to 
culpability centers on the insanity rules outlined in Part II, supra.  At trial, 
psychiatric testimony oftentimes becomes a “battle of the experts,”171 (usually more 
so than at the “incompetence” stage)172 where the court and jury are trying to 
elucidate the psychiatrist’s professional medical opinion on essentially a legal 
issue.173 Psychiatrists are expected to testify not only to the mental state of an 
individual, i.e., whether or not an individual suffers from mental disease (a relatively 
objective medical diagnosis), but also on whether or not the defendant is insane (a 
strictly legal term, bounded by the insanity defense rules).174 
Traditionally, neither physicians nor lay witnesses were allowed to testify on the 
“ultimate question,” i.e., whether the defendant is “responsible.”175  This prohibition 
has survived to the present day,176 although, perhaps in name and form only, rather 
than substance.177 The reason for refusing to entertain psychiatrists’ testimony on the 
issue of responsibility stems from the idea that responsibility is a legal finding that 
the jury cannot cede to any individual or even a panel of experts.178  Traditionally, 
                                                                
168Id. 
169Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 312.   
170GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 124. 
171Id. 103-04. 
172This is due to the fact that at the “competence” stage the defendant is often examined by 
a court appointed, “independent” psychiatrist whose opinion carry great weight.  See supra 
notes 152-60 and the accompanying text. 
173As can be expected, the psychiatrist’s expertise is in medical issues of mental illness.  
The jury however has to come to a legal conclusion as to responsibility.  Thus, whenever a 
psychiatrist is asked questions, issues such as “whether the defendant was responsible” or 
“could appreciate his actions,” he is rendering an opinion on a legal issue while armed only 
with medical expertise.    
174GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 97. 
175Id. 
176See, e.g., FED.R. EVID. 704(b); United States v. Hillsberg, 812 F.2d 328, 331-32 (7th 
Cir. 1987); United States v. Felak, 831 F.2d 794, 797 (8th Cir. 1987). 
177Nowadays, psychiatrists can testify as to sanity, and also answer “test questions,” thus 
in essence rendering the prohibition on “ultimate question” testimony toothless.  See infra, 
notes 178-87 and accompanying text. 
178See Bryant v. State, 13 S.E.2d 820 (1941). 
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psychiatrists were also not allowed to testify as to “test questions,”179 i.e., whether 
the defendant satisfied the requisite test for insanity (e.g., whether the defendant 
knew right from wrong).180  Thus, psychiatric testimony was limited essentially to 
medical issues.181  Again, the reason that was advanced for keeping psychiatrists 
from testifying about appreciation of “right and wrong” (or any other legal standard 
for that matter) is that the jury and not a witness (expert or otherwise) should be the 
ultimate judge on this issue.182  
Notwithstanding the above objections, recently, the courts have been more and 
more tolerant of psychiatrists being asked and answering “test questions.”183 Indeed, 
allowing testimony on “test questions” is the rule in the majority of jurisdictions.184  
The Model Penal Code allows an expert (presumably a mental health professional) to 
testify as to the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the nature and/or criminality 
of his conduct.185  The proponents of this new rule respond to the objections of the 
years past by suggesting that the jury would be better served and better informed by 
“expert” testimony.186  This view, however, fails to take into account the reality that 
when psychiatrists are asked to testify on “test questions,” the defense and 
prosecution “experts” will almost invariably come to different conclusions.187  When 
such divergent views are presented to the jury, the jury “tend[s] to supplant the 
factual detail upon which the decision for responsibility should ideally be based.  … 
The jury is left with the impression that it must choose between the experts…”188  
The jury, if convinced that the defendant is sane, will presumably rely (at least to 
some extent) on the testimony of the psychiatrist for the state.189  Thus, this 
testimony would be one of the reasons of someone being sent to jail.  On the other 
hand, the jury, if convinced the defendant is insane, will presumably base its findings 
(at least in part) on the testimony of a defense psychiatrist.  In this case, the 
psychiatrist’s testimony will be responsible for potentially letting a criminal, or at the 
                                                                
179See, e.g., State v. McCann, 47 S.W.2d 95 (1932). 
180LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 378. 
181See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 98.  ([The expert] would be permitted to answer only 
‘questions upon the matter of science.’”) 
182Id. at 99. 
183See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07(4). 
184LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 378. 
185MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07(4). 
186See WEIHOFEN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE, supra note 140, at 286 (1954).   
187If the experts were to come to the same conclusion the need for trial would be obviated, 
as prosecution is unlikely try a case where the defendant would be pronounced insane even by 
the state expert.  Alternatively, if the defense expert found the defendant sane, the counsel for 
the defense is unlikely to call such expert to the stand. 
188GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 103-04. 
189This presumption must hold because otherwise one must conclude that the psychiatric 
testimony is of no value whatever. 
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very least, a dangerous human being, roam free in an unprotected society.190  In both 
cases, psychiatrists face an ethical dilemma as to the appropriate course of action, 
and this article proposes a solution to this ethical quandary.  Additionally, of course, 
the standards for “insanity” are different between the different courts,191 and thus 
psychiatrists are almost forced to come to different conclusions on sanity in different 
jurisdictions, even though these conclusions are based on the same clinical data.  In a 
scientific world to which psychiatrists belong by virtue of their belonging to the 
medical profession, identical data should lead to identical results.192  When the 
identical data leads to divergent results, the conclusion is inescapable that something 
other than a scientific approach to the clinical problem at hand has taken place.  If 
that is indeed true, then the psychiatrists involved are not living up to the standards 
of their profession. 
3.  Competency at Execution 
Even if an accused is found competent to stand trial, and then found guilty (i.e., 
either does not raise or is not successful in his insanity defense) and is sentenced to 
death, he cannot be executed if he ceases being competent at any time between the 
verdict and the carrying out of the sentence.193 It is then of no surprise that the 
question of competence arises quite often in the context of execution.194 Psychiatrists 
are again called on to examine the prisoner and to render their expert opinion on the 
matter.195 
The involvement of psychiatrists in competency for execution adjudication is 
nothing new, but until the 1980s, the involvement was rather low profile.196  One of 
the reasons was that in years gone by executions occurred quite soon after trial, so 
there was little need for an evaluation separate from that conducted prior to trial.197  
Additionally, any deterioration that used to occur prior to the advent of psychotropic 
medication was the result of progressing disease.198  Typically, unmedicated disease 
was slow to progress,199 and thus a person who was competent to stand trial would 
                                                                
190Granted, in most instances NGRI acquittees are civilly confined.  See infra, notes 246-
77 and the accompanying text.  However, the possibility does exist that such release will 
occur. 
191See supra, notes 113-14 and the accompanying text. 
192The very definition of a valid scientific experiment is that it is reproducible.  If one 
cannot come to the same result using the same data, the experiment is not considered valid. 
193Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 
194It is not for this article to debate whether all, some or none of these claims of 
incompetence are genuine.  What this article does suggest that given the stakes, it is possible 
and indeed desirable (from the point of view of the condemned) to attempt to manipulate the 
system, and enlist help of the psychiatrist in the process. 
195See Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 311-16. 
196Id. at 305-10. 
197Id. at 305. 
198Id. at 306. 
199Id. 
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likely remain competent at the time of the execution.200  By contrast, after the advent 
of antipsychotic medication, post-trial deterioration could well be the result of 
withdrawing medication.201  The deterioration in such circumstances was much more 
rapid;202 the prisoner who was quite competent to stand trial could rapidly become 
incompetent thereafter if the medications were withdrawn.203  Because of the above 
possibility, the State had to institute a separate procedure to evaluate competence 
prior to execution.204  
The procedures established in response to the need for separate competency 
evaluation prior to execution were originally quite informal.205  Not until Ford v. 
Wainwright206 was decided in 1986, establishing a constitutional prohibition on 
executing the insane, was there a requirement for any adjudicatory proceedings in the 
matter.207  Indeed, as late as the 1950s, the Court viewed execution reprieves as no 
different from other clemency issues, best left to the discretion of the executive.208  
The executive could base his decision on psychiatric reports, but was not required to 
do so.209  Psychiatrists were then just advisors to the executive authority.210 
Additionally, psychiatrists could simply subvert the justice system by refusing to 
notify prison authorities of any improvement in mental health of the prisoners in 
their care.211  Once a warden ordered a transfer of a prisoner to a psychiatric unit, the 
                                                                
200Id.  Although competency for execution may not be the same as competency to stand 
trial, given the very low threshold for the former, one is likely to satisfy it if one is competent 
to stand trial.  See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 421 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that 
one is competent for execution if one has “awareness of the penalty’s existence and purpose”).  
It seems that this is a less demanding standard then competency for trial where one needs to be 
not only aware of the proceedings, but be able to understand them.   
201Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 306. 
202Id. 
203Id.  This is not to say that these procedures met the requirements later announced in 
Ford.  Nonetheless, the states did undertake a separate evaluation of the condemned.    
204The actual procedural requirements are quite unclear.  Although Ford v. Wainwright, 
did hold that executing the incompetent is not constitutionally permissible, and required that 
the prisoner be heard on the issue, the parameters of the hearing are unclear.  See LAFAVE, 
supra note 8, at 362. 
205Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 306. 
206477 U.S. 399. 
207See, e.g., Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1950) (declining to find a 
constitutional requirement to have a judicial-type procedure when a claim of incompetence at 
the time of execution is raised).   
208Id.   
209See Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 307. 
210See FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1983) (stating that the governor may act upon 
recommendations of psychiatrists).  
211Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 307. 
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psychiatrist in charge could simply keep him there indefinitely, thus essentially 
“lifting” the death sentence.212 
After Ford, the procedure for evaluating pre-execution competence has become 
more formalized and vested in the judicial as opposed to the executive branch.213  
The procedure today is very similar to a trial.214  That decision requires that a hearing 
be held in order to determine competency for execution; and that such hearing is to 
be a de novo review of the incompetence claim.215  As it is now an evidentiary 
hearing, by its very nature it requires evidence to be adduced.  Thus, psychiatrists are 
given yet another opportunity to participate in a legal process, with all the trap doors 
attendant thereto.      
4.  Medicating the Prisoners 
Psychiatrists can also be involved in the criminal justice system outside of the 
courthouse (albeit still within the criminal justice system).  The criminal justice 
system uses psychiatrists in order to provide medical regimens to inmates.216  The 
most common use is for psychiatrists to medicate those individuals who suffer from 
some sort of mental disease, but are confined in mental institutions.  However, 
psychiatrists are also used to administer medications to incompetent individuals, in 
hopes of making them competent to stand trial,217 as well as occasionally, to make 
them competent enough to be executed.218  In two recent decisions, the criminal 
justice system has deemed the use of psychiatrists to involuntarily administer 
medications to be acceptable and indeed desirable,219 a proposition that at least at 
first glance does not correspond to the “primum non nocere” norm of medical 
ethics.220 
The most authoritative, albeit incomplete, pronouncement on the issue of pre-trial 
forced medication came in 1992.  In Riggins v. Nevada,221 the defendant (petitioner) 
was medicated against his will, was convicted, sentenced to die, and then challenged 
                                                                
212Id. 
213See id. at 309. 
214See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 413-16 (1986) (holding that prisoner must be 
able to offer evidence, cross-examine state’s experts, and seek judicial review of fact-finding 
proceedings). 
215Id. at 418. 
216Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 311-16. 
217See infra notes and accompanying text. 
218Bloche, Psychiatry and Capital Punishment, supra note 126, at 311-12. 
219Id. at 316-17. 
220Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that it is 
constitutionally permissible to forcefully medicate a prisoner in order to restore competency 
for execution); United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that it is 
constitutionally permissible to forcefully medicate a prisoner in order to restore competency to 
stand trial). 
221504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
190 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 17:169 
his conviction and sentence on the grounds that forcible medication was used.222  The 
Court refused to allow such medication when the state could not show that 
medication was needed to maintain competence,223 and/or that less drastic 
alternatives were unavailable.224  The Court noted that pre-trial medication is 
impermissible “absent a finding of overriding justification and… medical 
appropriateness.”225  (It is noteworthy that the Court did not say medical necessity).226  
As there was no showing in Riggins that the trial could not proceed absent 
medication,227 the first prong was not satisfied.   
It is far from clear what the Court meant when it said “medically appropriate.” 
The minimalist approach to this statement would simply evaluate the efficacy of 
treatment offered.  Thus, if a given medication restores competence it is medically 
appropriate.  This however, does not take into account the patient’s own wishes.  In a 
broader sense, no treatment unless consented to is appropriate for a given patient, no 
matter how efficacious it may be.  To say otherwise would be to start on a slippery 
slope towards such “treatments” as forced sterilization.  They are most certainly 
“medically appropriate” in a sense that they are highly efficacious in achieving their 
goal of limiting certain individual’s reproductive ability.  Nevertheless, one is hard-
pressed to state that these “treatments” are indeed “appropriate.”  Thus, unless there 
is an emergent circumstance, where lives are threatened or where patient’s consent 
cannot be obtained, an unconsented treatment should not be considered “medically 
appropriate.” 
The issue of whether it is legal to medicate someone for the sole purpose of 
restoring competence to stand trial is currently before the Supreme Court.228  The 
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has held that such use of medical knowledge is 
appropriate.229  In Sell v. United States,230 a split panel of the Eighth Circuit held that 
the government’s interest in bringing an incompetent defendant to trial is a sufficient 
reason to have him medicated against his will.231  (As the defendant was 
                                                                
222Id. at 129-31. 
223See id. at 138 (“[T]he record contains no finding that might support a conclusion that 
administration of antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state 
policy…”).  The decision on this issue was reserved for another day.  See id. at 135 (“[T]he 
State might have been able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the 
drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence by 
using less intrusive means.”)  The Court may address it this Term in Sell v. United States, 123 
S. Ct. 512 (2002) (order granting certiorari). 
224Riggins, 540 U.S. at 135. 
225Id.  
226Necessity would imply that there is no other choice.  Medical appropriateness may 
simply mean that the treatment is one generally acceptable for a given condition and is not 
futile or one which is more detrimental than beneficent to the patient’s health. 
227Id. at 138. 
228Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 512 (2002) (order granting certiorari).   
229United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002). 
230Id. 
231Id. at 568. 
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incompetent,232 and as competency could be, at least potentially, restored via 
medication,233 the “medical appropriateness” prong was satisfied, at least insofar as 
the treatment was efficacious).234  In that case the court acknowledged that there was 
no reason, such as danger to self or others, except the desire to bring the prisoner to 
trial, that would necessitate medication.235  The court’s reasoning allows psychiatrists 
to be employed for purposes that although medically appropriate,236 would go against 
the interest of the patient insofar as retention of autonomy over medical decisions is 
a primary interest. 
Shortly following the Sell decision, the Eighth Circuit also dealt with the issue of 
whether it is permissible to medicate someone against his will solely for the purpose 
of having an individual regain competence for execution.237  In Singleton v. Norris,238 
a 6-5 majority (hearing the case en banc) held that indeed this too is permissible.239  
If Sell could be defended on the grounds that at the very least the defendant once 
restored to competency will be able to live a “normal” life (albeit behind bars), 
Singleton suggests that psychiatric knowledge can be used for the purposes of ending 
life.240  This is inimical to all the training and education that physicians get, and is no 
different than a physician directly administering lethal drugs in an execution 
setting.241 
5.  Treating the Acquitted 
Perhaps the most “medical”242 of all points of psychiatric involvement in the 
criminal justice system is the treatment of NGRI acquittees.  Some jurisdictions 
exercise mandatory commitment following an NGRI acquittal,243 and some 
                                                                
232Id. at 563. 
233Id. at 568-70. 
234United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d at 570-71. 
235Id. at 568.  The court only dealt with the Government’s interest in bringing the 
defendant to trial and found that interest alone to be sufficient.  See 282 F.3d at 568. 
236Id.  Again, the court seems to assume that the measure of “appropriateness” is simply 
efficacy; a proposition that is quite dubious from the viewpoint of medical ethics.  See Part V, 
infra. 
237Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir.  2003) (en banc). 
238Id. 
239Id. at 1026. 
240Id. at 1036-37 (Jeaney, J., dissenting). 
241See, e.g., David A. Rothstein, M.D., Letter to the Editor, 20 Newsl. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry & L. 111, 112 (1995).  See also infra, Part V.A. 
242
“Medical” in a sense that the NGRI acquittees are treated as any other patient confined 
to a mental institution would be.  Although, obviously the acquittees are in the hospital 
involuntarily, their medical regimen does not depend on their status.  In this sense, 
psychiatrists do not act as extensors of the penal system whose primary purpose is to advance 
penological interests, but instead as physicians who care for the ill.   
243See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4243; MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(1). 
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permissive.244  The goals served by commitment are two-fold.  One, as mentioned in 
Part II, supra, is restraint of those individuals who commit crimes as a result of their 
illness.245  The other is to treat and rehabilitate (in the medical sense of the word) 
these mentally ill individuals.  These two goals do not always coincide; consequently 
psychiatrists at least occasionally end up treating people in a manner that is 
suboptimal for the clinical presentation.246  In these instances it is rather clear that 
psychiatrists are not practicing good medicine, instead they are serving as mere 
extensions of the penal system.   
C.  The Consequences of Being Adjudged Insane 
Irrespective of what test the courts have used, the tradition that those suffering 
from “insanity” should not be held criminally responsible is a deeply rooted one.247  
If the defendant satisfied the test du jour, he would not be liable to criminal 
sanctions.248  The rationale for such treatment of the insane is manifold and has 
changed with the times.  As noted above, for many years it was thought to be 
improper to punish a child who couldn’t reason (at least according to the Bible).249  
Consequently, it was just as improper to punish someone who was nothing more than 
a child.250  Throughout the years, another notion, that it is rather pointless to 
administer punishment to someone who will learn nothing from such punishment and 
will not be deterred from further criminal activity as a result of his insanity, has 
taken hold.251  
Originally (i.e., in the medieval times), those found to be of “unsound mind” at 
the time of the commission of the crime were not held criminally liable, and could be 
free to conduct their lives as any other person would have,252 except that at least until 
the seventeenth century the property of the defendant so acquitted was still subject to 
forfeiture.253  The check on such release of dangerous elements into society was the 
fact that under early tests for “madness” very few dangerous individuals were 
acquitted.254  The degree of “madness” to be demonstrated had to be truly extreme in 
                                                                
244LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 383.  Nonetheless, commitment usually follows even in 
permissive jurisdictions.  See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 145. 
245See supra, notes 45-46 and accompanying text.   
246See infra, notes 275-78 and accompanying text.   
247See supra, notes 15-47 and accompanying text. 
248See supra, notes 86-125 and accompanying text. 
249See supra, note 87 and accompanying text. 
250See supra, note 88 and accompanying text. 
251See supra, notes 17-47 and accompanying text. 
252SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 392-93 (1925) (“before 
1800, in England, and in most jurisdictions in this country, if an accused person was found to 
be irresponsible by reason of insanity he was forthwith acquitted, and no special order looking 
to his safety or that of society was made”.) 
253Abraham L. Halpern, The Insanity Verdict, The Psychopath, And Post-Acquittal 
Confinement, 24 PAC. L.J. 1125, 1129 (1993).  
254Id. 
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order to be exculpated, and few defendants satisfied the test.255  However, those that 
did satisfy the test were indeed released.   
Although the defendants were not held criminally liable, they were not 
“acquitted” in the full sense of the word.256  Instead, the jury rendered a verdict of 
guilty, together with the special verdict of “lunacy,” and the combination of these 
two verdicts invariably led to a Royal Pardon.257  The prisoner was then released with 
no other special provisions for his care.258  In 1800, however, the Criminal Lunatics 
Act required those defendants found “mad” to be committed to a secure institution 
“until His Majesty’s pleasure be known.”259  This was the beginning of 
institutionalizing the criminally insane.  It is worth noting that the institutionalization 
was for an indefinite260 (and potentially life-long) period even in cases where the 
incarceration in prison would have been of a relatively short duration.261  Indeed, the 
defendant in one of the most celebrated cases of that time (the very case that 
prompted the passage of the Criminal Lunatics Act), James Hadfield, was acquitted 
of trying to assassinate the King,262 but was nonetheless committed to Bethlem 
Hospital.263  That the purpose of such confinement was not to treat but to 
preventively detain,264 can be evidenced from the very language of the statute.  The 
Act notably did not call for detainment until “return to sanity,” but rather until the 
King chose to release the prisoner. 
Indeed, it has been said that in the Victorian England “most criminal lunatics 
remained in gaol.”265  But even when lunatics were separated from the general prison 
population and institutionalized in separate institutions, the confinement in these 
secure institutions often did not differ much from prison.266 
                                                                
255Id. 
256Id. 
257Id. 
258GLUECK, supra note 251, at 392-93. 
259Criminal Lunatics Act of 1800, 40 Geo. 3, c. 94 (1800). 
260The term “until His Majesty’s pleasure be known” is the very definition of indefinite 
confinement.   
261The Act covered all felony NGRI acquittals, not just the serious ones.  Criminal 
Lunatics Act of 1800, 40 Geo. 3, c. 94 (1800) (“[U]pon the trial of any person charged with 
treason, murder or felony…”) 
262See supra, notes 60-75 and accompanying text.   
263Halpern, supra notes 252, at 1132. 
264See id. at n.27 (“Ordinary lunatics at that time were sent to Bethlem Hospital, where the 
supervision was not particularly strict; and if Hadfield were to escape he would probably take 
another shot at the King”) (quoting Ralph Partridge, Broadmoor 1 (1953)). 
265ROGER SMITH, TRIAL BY MEDICINE: INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILITY IN VICTORIAN TRIALS 
23 (1981). 
266For example, Maryland allowed “mental defectives” (not the NGRI acquittees, but 
instead convicted individuals who were deemed to be “mentally defective”) to be confined to 
Patuxent State Institution, for indefinite secure confinement.  See State v. McCray, 297 A.2d 
265, 268 (Md. 1972) (describing some of the restrictions in Patuxent).    
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Similar treatment was accorded to lunatics in other countries as well.  For 
instance, in China, where “madness” was never an exculpation, but grounds for 
sentence mitigation,267 starting in the 17th century, those deemed to be “mad” were 
released into the custody of their family.268  The people so released had to be kept 
manacled,269 and the family, under the threat of a rather severe punishment, had to 
control the individual.270  However, this “humane” treatment of the insane soon gave 
way to forced registration and institutionalization.271  As in England, in China the 
original intent of the confinement was not to treat, but to isolate dangerous 
individuals from the society.272  
The requirement of post-NGRI acquittal confinement largely persists to this 
day.273  Although the stated goal of confinement today is medical cure,274 as opposed 
to the former goal of isolation, confinement and psychiatrists are too often used for 
purposes other than treatment.275  Too often, irrespective of the committed person’s 
actual state of mind, the commitment is continued.276  Furthermore, the psychiatric 
profession at times advocated continued commitment of those individuals who have 
retained their “sanity” but continue to manifest “personality disorders.”277  This type 
of treatment suggests that the true goal behind institutionalization is punitive rather 
than rehabilitative in nature.  The courts have not been shy in ignoring psychiatric 
recommendations for release in those who reacquired their sanity.  For example, in 
Francois v.  Henderson,278 the judge refused to release a patient who for over five 
years exhibited no symptoms of mental disease or other abnormalities on the ground 
                                                                
267See Munro, supra note 4, at 15-16 (For example,“[t]he death penalty for murder, 
normally mandatory in such cases, was not applied in cases where the offender was shown to 
be insane at the time of the crime, even when the victim was one of the offender's own 
parents.  An exception to this rule of clemency was made, however, if the victim was one of 
the grandparents.  The death penalty was applied also in the case of multiple homicides by the 
insane”). 
268Id. at 15. 
269Id. 
270Id. 
271Id. 
272Id.   
273See supra text accompanying notes 241-42.   
274See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4243(e) (“[T]he Attorney General shall hospitalize the person for 
treatment in a suitable facility…”) (emphasis added). 
275See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-66 (1997) (noting that “under the 
appropriate circumstances and when accompanied by proper procedures, incapacitation [as 
opposed to treatment] may be a legitimate end of the civil law”); Jones v. United States, 463 
U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (noting that “the purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal 
… is to treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential 
dangerousness”) (emphasis added). 
276HALPERN, supra note 252, at 1134.   
277Id. 
278850 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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that such behavior is indeed evidence of mental illness, as the prisoner is faking 
sanity!279  
While it can be argued that the mentally ill ought to be punished, it is the 
contention of this article that even so, it is still wholly improper to use medical 
professionals to mete out the punishment.  The above statement applies with equal 
force irrespective of whether the patient is confined in a mental institution or has his 
liberty otherwise restricted (e.g., by having to participate in an outpatient program) if 
such restriction serves no legitimate medical end. 
As can be seen from some of the above examples, psychiatric involvement have 
not eliminated arbitrariness or brought about an exclusively scientific approach to the 
mental health problems encountered in the criminal justice system.  Instead, medical 
pronouncements are used to cloak judicial preferences with a mantle of scientific 
legitimacy.  A physician thus used becomes an instrument of the penal system as 
opposed to a healer or even a scientist in search of truth.  Such a system cannot be 
deemed to be satisfactory.    
IV.  INDEPENDENT PANELS-AN UNACCEPTABLE SOLUTION 
Some have argued that the underlying problem with the American conception of 
the psychiatry-criminal justice interaction is that it relies on independent witnesses 
for the defense and prosecution.280  It is argued that by being a witness for either side 
the psychiatrist has a stake in the outcome, and that in and of itself is 
unprofessional.281  The proposed solution is replacing “hired guns” with an 
independent panel, composed of a number of psychiatrists whose conclusions are to 
be accepted by the court.282  The argument goes as follows: Because the psychiatrists 
are independent they would not have a stake in the outcome, and because there 
would be no “hired guns,” there would be no “expert battles,” an affair that 
diminishes the medical profession as a whole.283  For the reasons set forth below, it is 
the contention of this author that this solution would not solve the fundamental 
problem of medical professionals operating outside of their area of expertise, and 
beyond what can be considered ethical medical behavior. 
As can be imagined, the American system of psychiatric involvement in the 
adjudicatory process is not the only option available, and has not been universally 
embraced.  The former Soviet Union,284 the People’s Republic of China,285 and 
                                                                
279See id. at 235 (One of the physicians testified that sanity can be feigned, albeit he 
qualified that by stating it is unlikely that such feigning can go on for more than a few hours.  
The trial court, relying on the testimony of that physician, declined to release Francois 
anyway). 
280See supra text accompanying note 137. 
281Id. 
282Id. 
283Id. 
284For a description of the Soviet system see M. Gregg Bloche, Law, Theory and Politics: 
The Dilemma of Soviet Psychiatry, 11 YALE J. INT’L. L. 297 (1986) (hereinafter Soviet 
Psychiatry).     
285For a description of the People’s Republic of China’s system see MUNRO, supra note 4. 
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USSR’s successor, the Russian Federation286 are but a few states that employ 
different process and procedures to separate the competent from the incompetent and 
the sane from the insane.  This section will describe the operation of the system and 
highlight a specific case to show that merely switching from partisan experts to 
independent panels is unlikely to resolve the problem of psychiatrists straying 
beyond medical issues and on to the field of moral judgments about the accused.   
A.  Psychiatric Evaluation in the Soviet Criminal Justice System 
In the USSR, the court or the Procuracy287 could order a psychiatric examination 
of the accused.  The examination was conducted by a team of psychiatrists288 
appointed by the court (or Procuracy).  The team consisted of three experts who 
conducted their evaluation based on the guidelines published by Serbsky Institute of 
Forensic Psychiatry.289  Following such guidelines was mandatory.290  The patient-
accused was not entitled to challenge the proceedings in any way, either in person, 
through counsel, or through family.291  The team of psychiatrists was asked to 
address several questions.  First, does the accused suffer from any mental illness?  
Second, is his illness such that he did not “realize the significance of his actions” or 
that he “could not control them?”  Finally, and most troubling, the psychiatrists were 
asked whether the accused was “socially dangerous.”  The reason the second and 
third questions are troubling is because both of them ask a psychiatrist to pass on a 
legal proposition.  Medical knowledge is either irrelevant or of very little use in 
answering these questions.  The answer to these questions is likely to be based on the 
psychiatrist’s worldview (e.g., what constitutes danger to his society)292 as opposed 
to any scientific fact or criterion.   
The findings of the forensic psychiatrists were submitted to the court293 that held 
a summary, often ex parte hearing where it determined whether to accept the 
                                                                
286The Russian Federation inherited its system from the former Soviet Union and did not 
significantly change it.  Russia recently adopted a new Criminal Procedural Code in 2001, 
although it did not take effect until July 1, 2002.  Prior to that the Russian Federation used the 
old Soviet Criminal Procedure Code of 1960.  Federal’nyi Zakon No. 177-FZ 12/18/2001, 
Ross. Gazeta 12/22/2001. 
287See id. at n.95.  Procuracy (Prokuratura) is a State organ (both in the USSR and RF) 
separate from the Ministry of Justice that is responsible for bringing prosecutions, 
investigating cases, and ensuing compliance with the law. 
288See BLOCHE, supra note 283, at 318.   
289Id.at 318. 
290Id. at 323.  Although at first glance this may be seen as subtracting from the authority of 
the experts conducting the examination, it does not have to be.  In the United States experts 
often follow guidelines published by the Group for Advancement of Psychiatry, and follow the 
diagnostic pattern based on the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders.  
291Id. at 319. 
292See id.  at 320-23 (discussing the role of value preferences). 
293Id. 
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findings and recommendations.294  In practice the reports were never challenged,295 
and the determinations of the psychiatrists were accepted.296  
In this system, the psychiatrists are again employed in a way that requires them to 
make pronouncements on the issue of legal responsibility.297  Granted, no “battle of 
the experts” ensues,298 as the only report of any significance is that submitted by the 
“independent” medical experts,299 but nonetheless, the medical profession takes upon 
itself tasks that it is not designed to handle, while the legal profession cedes its 
authority and expertise to professionals from another field. 
The abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union has been well-documented300 and 
this article will not dwell on its nature.  There are now an increasing number of 
reports that similar misuse of psychiatry occurs in the People’s Republic of China,301 
among other countries.  It is hardly surprising that a repressive regime would attempt 
to use medicine for its own means.302  However, with a process outlined above in 
place, a country need not be repressive for the science of psychiatry to be put to use 
in an area beyond its scope of expertise, thus perverting the science by asking it to 
make scientifically unsupported judgments.303  With this system of psychiatric 
participation, psychiatrists invariably will and do attach their own values to the 
evaluation of the accused.304  An “independent” psychiatrist is essentially given a 
free hand to project his personal and societal sympathies and antipathies onto a 
patient and to have his “scientific” conclusion mirror his moral world outlook.305  Of 
course in a repressive regime, a psychiatrist whose moral outlook mirrors that of a 
political accused is unlikely to find himself as one of the examining experts.306 
                                                                
294Id. 
295Id. 
296Id. 
297See id. at 319.  (The Court reviews the psychiatrists’ finding as to whether the defendant 
is responsible for his conduct.  Of course, as stated above, such review is quite perfunctory.)  
298Id. at 318.  (noting that “psychiatric examiners appointed by investigators and courts are 
officially viewed as impartial and objective; thus defense consultation with experts is deemed 
unnecessary.”)  
299See supra text accompanying notes 193-194. 
300See generally BLOCHE, supra note 283. 
301See generally MUNRO, supra note 4.   
302See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Physician’s Dilemma of Divided Loyalty, 16 INT’L. J. L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 371, 373 (1993).   
303See infra notes 307-35 and the accompanying text. 
304See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 122; BLOCHE,  supra note 283, at 320-23. 
305Any psychiatrist projects his views on the problem before him, but an “independent 
one” is free from the threat of probing and/or impeaching questions or counter testimony.  
Thus, an “independent” expert is not checked by anything. 
306Cf. BLOCHE, supra note 283, at 318. (noting that either the court or the Procuracy 
appoint the “experts,” and, being agents of the repressive state, they presumably have little 
interest in having dissident’s view bolstered.) 
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Nevertheless, the underlying problem remains the same irrespective of what views 
psychiatrists actually hold.    
The fact that a system need not be repressive or have procedures shrouded in 
secrecy (as they were in Soviet times) in order to enmesh the medical profession and 
its “independent experts” in a legal and political quagmire, is best illustrated by the 
recent and ongoing case of Russian Colonel Yuri Budanov.   
B.  The Case of Colonel Yuri Budanov 
Colonel Budanov was a senior federal (i.e., Russian government) military officer 
engaged in the military operations in the breakaway republic of Chechnya.307  In 
March 2000, while conducting a military operation, Mr. Budanov captured, 
kidnapped and strangled Elza Kungaeva, an 18-year old Chechen girl.308  The colonel 
was indicted on charges of exceeding authority,309 kidnapping,310 rape311 (later 
dropped),312 and murder.313  Originally, the defense claimed that the girl was a 
sniper,314 and a part of a terrorist network; consequently, Budanov did not commit 
murder, but merely exceeded his authority by killing her.315  However, later, the 
defense claimed that at any rate, Col. Budanov was “nevmeniaem”316 at the time of 
the crime.317  In the context of the plea it signified a claim that at the time of the 
                                                                
307See Michael R. Gordon, Russian Troops in Chechnya Find Little Quiet on the Southern 
Front, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at A1. 
308http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/01/15/sudzabylopol.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2003). 
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313UK RF § 105(2), http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/05/13/kakrazvivalo.shtml. 
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him and he responded disproportionally.  This behavior is “clearly beyond official powers,” 
and therefore would subject Budanov to prosecution for violating UK RF § 216.  On the issue 
of being attacked see http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/05/13/kakrazvivalo.shtml (last visited Apr.  
14, 2003). 
316
“Nevmeniaem” is often translated as “criminally irresponsible,” although this translation 
does not give full appreciation of the term’s meaning.  In all its fullness, the term encompasses 
lack of criminal responsibility, legal insanity, and lack of social awareness of one’s actions.  
Indeed, one of the colloquial translations of “nevmeniaem” is “beside oneself.”  OXFORD 
RUSSIAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 267 (1994).   
317http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3242564&s=11 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2003); see also Patrick Tyler, Police in Chechnya Accuse Russia's Troops of Murder, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at A1 (stating that military officials “demand[ed] … psychiatric 
evaluations … to determine whether Colonel Budanov was temporarily insane”). 
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crime the colonel was in such a mental state as to prevent him from understanding 
his actions.   
The case was complicated by several political considerations.  First, the Russian 
government vehemently denied any human rights abuses in Chechnya.318  Second, up 
until the episode with Ms. Kungaeva, Col. Budanov was a model and decorated 
officer,319 and a hero to many; thus any aspersions upon him were often viewed as 
casting a pall over the entire Russian Army.320  It is in this situation that the court had 
to work.   
As required by law, Mr. Budanov was sent to undergo a psychiatric evaluation.321  
Local psychiatrists viewed him as completely sane and thus responsible for his 
actions.322  A second evaluation was then ordered.323  The results of this second 
examination were never officially revealed.324  A third assessment of the colonel was 
then conducted,325 this time at Moscow’s prestigious Serbsky Institute for Forensic 
Psychiatry,326 home to the most pre-eminent specialists in the field in all of  the 
Russian Federation.  The physicians from that evaluation concluded that Budanov 
was not able to realize the significance of his actions.327  Thus, the court was faced 
with two contradictory psychiatric conclusions.  Instead of querying the experts or 
allowing for their direct and cross-examination, the court at the behest of attorneys 
                                                                
318See Michael R. Gordon, Russian Official Tries to Ensure Rights in Chechnya, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2000, at A6 (noting that “most Russian officials reject Western human rights 
complaints as a plot to blacken the nation’s image”).  
319http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3241925&s=15 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2003). 
320See, e.g., http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3241891&s=11 (President of 
the Buryat Republic claims that Budanov may have been a victim of a Chechen plot) (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2003); http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=1559218&s=2 
(Cossacks and former commander of troops in Chechnya support Budanov.  General Shamilov 
claimed that the Budanov is accused only because of “ideological intervention of the West 
against Russia.”) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003); http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/ 
msg.html?mid=3242284&s=11 (Up to 50% of Russians believe that Budanov is not guilty of 
murder) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).    
321http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=1230830&s=2 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2003) 
322http://www.gazeta.ru/2002/12/31/budanovprizn.shtml (last visited Apr. 14, 2003). 
323See http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=2355527&s=9 (mentioning second 
evaluation) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003). 
324See id.  (Judge refusing to reveal the results of the evaluation) (last visited Apr. 14, 
2003). 
325http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3242565&s=11 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2003). 
326Id. 
327http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=1944662&s=10 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2003). 
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representing the family of the victim328 ordered a fourth exam.329  This exam was 
again conducted at the Serbsky Institute,330 and (unsurprisingly) again resulted in the 
finding of insanity at the time of the offense.331  Indeed, this fourth opinion stated 
that all previous studies underestimated the true nature of Budanov’s illness.332  
Again the experts were not questioned, and although both the prosecution and the 
victim’s counsel objected to the findings of the experts, the court accepted them 
without any hesitation,333 and acquitted Col. Budanov.334 
It cannot go unsaid that the last evaluation of the colonel occurred at the time 
when Chechen terrorists seized a Moscow theater along with several hundred 
hostages.335  Although this may be mere coincidence, the possibility that this event 
that shocked Russia played a role in the psychiatrist’s evaluation cannot be 
discounted.  The psychiatrists once again were given the opportunity to project their 
personal feeling towards the war in Chechnya, towards Chechen resistance fighters 
(or terrorists, depending on one’s point of view), on acceptable methods of 
combating terrorism, on the Russian Army, and on Chechens in general.  Far be it 
from the author of this article to accuse these psychiatrists of actually succumbing to 
                                                                
328Russian law provides for the victim or his family to be a part of a criminal prosecution.  
Indeed, even if the state prosecution and defense are satisfied with the outcome of the case, the 
victim’s attorney can still appeal.  UK RF § 45. 
329http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=2634075&s=10 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2003). 
330Id. 
331http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3051705&s=11 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2003). 
332http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3051704&s=11 (last visited Apr. 14, 
2003). 
333http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=3090899&s=11 (The court 
characterized the psychiatric conclusion merely as “scientifically sound” and based on such 
finding declared Col. Budanov was “nevmeniaem” at the time of the crime.) (last visited Apr. 
14, 2003).   
334On February 28th, 2003, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of Russian 
Federation set aside the decision of the lower court as procedurally erroneous, and remanded 
the case back to that court.  It further ordered that the case be tried before a different panel of 
judges.  Michael Wines, Russia Orders a New Trial In Chechnya Murder Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 1, 2003 at A4. 
335See Michael Wines, Chechens Seize Moscow Theater, Taking as Many as 600 
Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2002, at A1; Michael Wines, Russia Recaptures Theater After 
Chechen Rebel Group Begins to Execute Hostages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2002, at A1.  The 
fourth evaluation was conducted sometime between July 21, 2002 (the date when Budanov 
was sent from Rostov-on-Don, where he was tried, to Moscow, where he was evaluated) and 
September 29, 2002 (when the evaluation ended).  http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/ 
msg.html?mid=2826637&s=10 (last visited Apr. 14, 2003).  Although the evaluation was 
completed September 29, the report was not submitted until November, creating the possibility 
that the hostage situation in Moscow influenced the examiners’ findings.  No such accusations 
are being levied, but the mere possibility is quite troubling.  http://www.rambler.ru/db/ 
news/msg.html?mid=3251957&s=2 (stating that on November 18, 2002 all documents relating 
to the evaluation were completed and forwarded to the court) (last visited Apr. 14, 2003). 
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the opportunity; however, it is the author’s view that such opportunity should never 
be presented, lest the temptation is too great.  Regardless of how conscientious and 
upright an individual is, when asked a question of morals he will almost inevitably 
incorporate his life’s experience, political leanings, and social views into the answer.  
It is at this point that the physician stops being a healer and ends up being a part of 
the criminal justice system, and such a transformation is incompatible with medical 
ethics.  Granted, a physician may tailor his medical opinions to fit within a given 
political situation as well; however, medical opinions that are “tailored” to politics 
can be easier exposed than moral opinions.  As medical opinions are based in science 
(even if not fully precise science), the falsity of testimony not grounded in science 
can be rebutted by someone who is an expert in a given field of medicine.  A moral 
opinion cannot be false by definition, and therefore cannot be rebutted. 
The Soviet-Russian system of independent psychiatric panels at its core is no 
more objectionable from the viewpoint of medical ethics or legal policy than the 
American system of witnesses for either side, so long as it is limited strictly to the 
diagnosis of the disease.  However, once psychiatrists start operating in the land of 
morals, and in the realm of right and wrong, they are acting contrary to medical 
ethics regardless of what system they participate in.   
V.  ETHICAL PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY WITHIN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Psychiatrists serve multiple roles in the criminal justice system.  They are treating 
physicians, scientists who investigate and report, state employees, representatives of 
the medical profession in general, and citizens possessed of special knowledge that 
may be useful to the courts of law.  With so many hats to wear, psychiatrists 
potentially have several allegiances.  The question then is to whom do they own their 
loyalty in cases when there is a conflict of loyalties.  Some have suggested that 
because of the numerous incarnations of a forensic physician, a new ethical paradigm 
be adopted, one that is different from the traditional ethical duties of “primum non 
nocere.”  
One alternative advanced is the ethics of “truth.”336  According to Paul 
Appelbaum, the leading advocate of the “ethics of truth” the doctor is acting 
ethically so long as he is objectively evaluating a patient, and then testifies as to his 
findings.337  Under this theory, it is irrelevant what the outcome of such testimony 
would be, so long as the testifying physician was striving for scientific truth.338  The 
problem with this approach is that it essentially subsumes all of the forensic 
psychiatrist’s roles into one role of a researcher.  This approach may very well work 
for a forensic pathologist, who merely evaluates evidence (be it bullet trajectory, bite 
marks, or whatever else) and presents his testimony based on evaluation of such 
rather impersonal evidence.  The theory does not work for forensic psychiatry, 
because evidence is the live person, and evaluation of evidence (at least in order to 
get a full and complete picture) necessarily involves evaluation of an individual.  
When such evaluation occurs, the individual being evaluated becomes (however 
                                                                
336See, e.g., Paul Appelbaum, Psychiatric Ethics in the Courtroom, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 225 (1984). 
337Id. 
338Id. 
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briefly) a patient of the evaluator.339  If that is so, the evaluator’s duties with respect 
to that individual must be no different than any other physician’s duties to any other 
patient. 
The approach that makes the forensic psychiatrist owe primary allegiance to the 
patient, does not ignore forensic psychiatrist’s other duties, i.e., the one he owes to 
the state (his employer), the public at large, and the medical profession.  Instead, this 
approach suggests that whenever there is a physician-patient interaction (even if no 
treatment or further interactions are offered or contemplated) the physician’s 
obligation to a given patient takes primacy.   
Accepting the above proposition, this article relies on twin principles of “no 
harm”340 and “consent”341 to build a foundation of ethical behavior by psychiatrists.  
Additionally, the “professionalism” principle is a “final check” to be employed once 
the other two are satisfied.  Utilizing these principles, the psychiatrist does not 
compromise his duties to the patient, while the justice system is not robbed of the 
wisdom and knowledge of science. 
A.  Basic Principles 
The two principles of ethical behavior by psychiatrists are complementary and 
can hardly work one without one another.  Yet for ease of understanding and 
structure, they will be discussed separately. 
1.  The “No Harm” Principle 
Before a physician embarks on a course of action with a given patient he must 
pose a question to himself.  The question should ask whether the procedure or action 
sought to be undertaken is medically appropriate.342  If the proposed procedure is not 
medically appropriate, then it can be said that no medical benefit is derived from 
it.343  If no medical benefit accrues, it can be inferred that medical harm results.  It 
results either from the progress of the disease in the face of wrong treatment or from 
                                                                
339See David A. Rothstein, M.D., Psychiatrists’Involvement in Executions: Arriving at an 
Official Position, 20 NEWSLETTER AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 15, 17 (1995) (“anyone acting 
in a capacity that requires a psychiatrist's education, judgment, and experience is, in that role, 
practicing psychiatry.”)  If someone is practicing psychiatry, it then follows, that one is acting 
as a physician.  If that is so, one must assume all the duties and moral obligations of a 
physician. 
340This principle is derived from the Hippocratic Oath that states, in part “I will prescribe 
regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and never do 
harm to anyone.”  STEADMAN’S MED. DICTIONARY 799 (26th ed.) (1995).   
341The idea that a patient must consent to treatment derives from the Kantian notion that a 
person can never be a means to an end.  If treatment is undertaken without consent, a person is 
used as a means towards the end of better health.  In order for the person to be the end, not 
merely a means to an end, he must want to participate in a given activity, i.e., he must consent.  
The notion of consent also derives in part from the common law of battery.  See Cruzan ex rel. 
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). 
342Medically appropriate here means efficacious and within accepted medical practice. 
343There may be a “satisfaction” benefit to a patient who requests the procedure as a result 
of having his wishes fulfilled.  This will be discussed shortly. 
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the side-effects of the treatment itself.  In these situations medical harm outweighs 
medical benefit.   
The question then arises, does not the patient experience a benefit from having 
his wishes followed if he requests a treatment that the physician believes to be futile 
or otherwise incorrect, and if so, does that benefit not balance the harm?  The answer 
suggested here is “no.”  A patient’s consent is necessary344 but insufficient for a 
physician to initiate treatment.  The “primum non nocere” principle as envisioned 
here requires a physician using his specialized knowledge to evaluate scientific risks 
and benefits and satisfy himself that the risks are medically acceptable.  If he cannot 
so satisfy himself, it should not matter what the patient’s desires are.  Once the 
physician does satisfy himself that the risks are medically acceptable, he then 
proceeds to enquire of the patient whether the patient is willing to undergo these 
risks. 
To borrow on an example used in Part III.A.4, it is not unethical for a physician 
to participate in a procedure that results in sterilization of someone, because such 
procedure is efficacious.  However, prior to engaging in such a procedure, he must 
obtain a patient’s consent.345  A physician’s evaluation of clinical harms and benefits 
is therefore a condition precedent for taking any further actions. 
This reasoning applies only to medical (physiologic) issues, because it is on these 
issues that a physician has expertise, and can with reasonable scientific certainty 
predict possible outcomes.  On the other hand, a physician has no expertise in 
matters outside of medicine, and thus cannot as readily identify or valuate non-
physiologic harm.  In these matters, the valuation must reside with the patient.346 
When the issue is so framed, one needs to ask what qualifies as “harm?”  Hardly 
a clinical intervention occurs that does not result in some clinical side-effect (mostly 
of harmful nature), yet no one contests that administering antihypertensive 
medication is unethical merely because one of the side-effects is impotence 
(admittedly a harm to most individuals).347  Thus, mere presence of a harm that is 
possible or even inherent in a procedure cannot make the performance of the 
procedure unethical.  Only when harms outweigh benefits, should a physician refrain 
from acting.  A balancing of harms and benefits must ensue in order to determine 
whether a physician can ethically participate in a certain course of action.   
Before proceeding to an issue by issue consideration of psychiatric involvement 
in the criminal justice system in light of the above principle, a differentiation 
between clinical and non-clinical harms348 must be made.  Clinical harms are the 
physiologic consequences that result from the treatment,349 and are also known as 
side-effects.  A competent physician can make a judgment on an individual basis 
whether the clinical benefits to a given patient outweigh the clinical harm to that 
                                                                
344See Part V.A.2. 
345Id. 
346See Part V.A.2. 
347See PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 2284 (56th ed.) (2002). 
348See BLOCHE, supra note 126, at 316-19. 
349For example hair loss results from chemotherapy, and a loss of limb results from 
amputation due to gangrene. 
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patient.350  In order to assess the different clinical harms and benefits, the physician 
can call on his training and education qua physician.  It is within his area of expertise 
to evaluate whether a particular treatment will cause more physiologic damage than 
physiologic benefit and vice versa.  It is because of that skill that a physician’s 
assistance is sought in cases of illness.  Therefore, in a situation where only 
considerations are of a clinical (physiological) nature, a physician, regardless of 
where and by who employed, can make a routine assessment of whether the benefits 
outweigh the harms, making it ethical to embark upon the course of treatment 
(subject to restrictions in Part V.A.2). 
In the world of forensic psychiatry, however, there are also harms that can come 
about that are not physiologic, but that can be attributed to the physician’s work.  
These extra-clinical harms, on the other hand, are much harder to quantify and 
calibrate with respect to any individual patient.  What’s more, it may be hard to even 
agree on what constitutes an extra-clinical harm.  Even if it was possible to agree on 
what constitutes such extra-clinical harm, it is not readily apparent that physicians 
have any particular training or expertise to weigh these harms.  Given these twin 
problems of identification and valuation of extra-clinical harms, it is much more 
difficult to arrive at a straight-forward formula for ethical behavior on the part of a 
physician.  Nonetheless, extra-clinical harms must be taken into account and 
balanced against benefits prior to choosing a course of action; and the benefits of the 
action chosen must outweigh the harms.  Although it is indeed difficult to define and 
valuate these harms, in the context of forensic psychiatry some extra-clinical harms 
are quite apparent.   
It must also be emphasized, that given the fact that the accused (or the 
condemned or the NGRI acquitee) is a patient of the forensic psychiatrist,351 it is his 
interests that psychiatrist should take into account, and not those of the society at 
large.  The patient’s interests take primacy over whatever benefits society would 
derive from a different course of action.  Because this is the standard that applies to 
the practice of medicine in the “free world” (i.e., in the world outside of criminal 
justice system), it should apply with equal force to the practice of medicine in 
another setting.  With this in mind, the extra-clinical harms to the patient can now be 
identified. 
Three main extra-clinical harms that stem from the interlacing of psychiatry and 
criminal justice system can be readily identified.  First, and perhaps most obvious is 
the criminal incarceration of the individual.  This qualifies as harm simply on the 
basis that incarceration is a punishment;352 something unpleasant that one endures as 
a consequence of bad actions. 
Second, the institutionalization at a mental hospital is also an extra-clinical harm.  
This is so for two reasons.  Institutionalization restricts the freedom of the individual; 
it also gives rise to negative societal attitudes towards patients.353  Stigma may also 
                                                                
350As suggested below, the mere fact that clinical benefits outweigh the clinical harms is 
not a blanket license to act in the face of the patient’s disagreement with that assessment. 
351See Rothstein, supra note 338 and accompanying text. 
352Here incarceration is limited strictly to criminal confinement.   
353See, e.g., Maria A. Morrison, Changing Perceptions of Mental Illness and the 
Emergence of Expansive Mental Health Parity Legislation, 45 S.D. L. REV. 8, 8-9 (2000). 
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arise from a finding of insanity which does not trigger confinement in a mental 
institution.  These harms are balanced against the benefits of medical help that one 
receives at the hospital and the benefits of not being incarcerated in prison as a result 
of the insanity finding.  It is hard if not impossible to determine when these benefits 
outweigh the harms or vice versa, and thus a psychiatrist enters a very murky world 
indeed when his chosen course of action results in either of the outcomes.   
The third harm that can arise from the involvement of psychiatrists in the penal 
process is the execution of the convicted individual.  Unlike the incarceration, the 
execution is permanent, and unlike institutionalization, execution is not balanced by 
any benefits to the individual.  (There may well be a societal benefit to executions, 
but that topic is best left for another article.  Whatever benefit accrues to the society 
as a result of execution or other penal measures, is nonetheless irrelevant, for as 
discussed above, in a patient-physician interaction, the physician should be 
concerned about patient’s harms and benefits not anyone else’s.) Regardless, a 
physician does not act ethically when he uses his knowledge for purposes that are 
antithetical to healing, and nothing is more antithetical to healing then causing a 
death of an otherwise healthy human being.354  
One can summarize the principle of “no harm” thus: a physician has to use his 
medical knowledge to determine whether or not clinical benefits outweigh clinical 
harms, and proceed only if they do.  Physician must leave the weighing of non-
clinical harms to the patient.  In other words, no harm can be phrased as “no clinical 
harm.” 
2.  The “Consent” Principle 
As discussed above, the “no harm” principle has certain limitations, namely, the 
difficulty in identifying and valuating extra-clinical harm especially when balanced 
by a clinical benefit.  Furthermore, “no harm” is not the end of the inquiry, as the 
sterilization example has shown.  Thus, an additional step is needed to satisfy oneself 
that the action taken is indeed in the patient’s interest. 
The basic principle that ought to govern any medical intervention is that of 
personal autonomy.  Personal autonomy is important for several reasons.  First, it is 
consistent with the Kantian prohibition against using a person as a means.  If a 
person is treated as nothing more than a mannequin that can be fine-tuned whenever 
something goes awry, then the individual is being used simply as a means to achieve 
a disease-free state.  Therefore, a physician must take patient’s desires into account 
before proceeding with any intervention.  In this way, the person is being treated as 
an end, because any intervention is done not with the goal of promoting general well-
being without reference to a specific individual, but with the goal of providing the 
patient with tools to achieve his own goals and live up to his own values. 
Second, personal autonomy is important because of the difference in value 
preferences between a doctor and the patient.355  It cannot be assumed that health and 
                                                                
354This does not necessarily imply that it is unethical for a physician to cause a death of an 
ill individual, as in for example assisted suicide.  Irrespective of how one chooses to think 
about the issue of assisted suicide, it has to be conceded that causing a death of a healthy 
individual through the use of medical knowledge is ethically unacceptable. 
355See generally Alan H. Goldman, The Refutation of Medical Paternalism, THE MORAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS.   
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prolonged life are the top values for every individual.356  Jehova’s Witnesses provide 
an excellent example.  Although blood transfusion may save the life of a given 
individual, it will be refused by a Jehova’s Witness, because fidelity to religious 
tenets is a higher order value for that individual than health or life.  For a physician it 
may be natural to elevate health to the top of the value rankings, as physician’s life is 
dedicated to the preservation of health,357 but for the patient, the rankings may be 
completely different.  Thus, in order to keep the patient’s value system intact, a 
physician should not act contrary to the patient’s wishes.358 
The patient himself must evaluate (after being provided with complete and 
truthful information) whether the benefits that any treatment will provide outweigh 
the harms inherent in such treatment.359  Given the fact that medications used to treat 
mental illness often have significant harmful side-effects,360 not to mention adverse 
extra-clinical consequences that arise out of being a confirmed mental patient, the 
individual should be allowed to judge for himself whether or not these negatives 
outweigh the positives of being under treatment. 
“Value-preference” consent theory is also useful in resolving the problem of 
extra-clinical harm.  As Part V.A.1 asserts, a physician has no expertise to perceive 
and quantify the extra-clinical harm that comes from interaction with the penal 
system versus, for example, the harm that comes from stigma of insanity label.  To 
be sure, a physician can most certainly express his preference if he himself were in a 
similar situation, but that preference cannot substitute for the preference of the 
patient.  Again then, consent is quite useful in resolving the dilemma of extra-clinical 
harm.   
The above of course assumes a patient who is able to make decisions and give or 
withhold consent for procedures.  A child, a person who lacks capacity to understand 
(e.g., someone with a low IQ score)361 and a person who is so mentally ill as to not be 
able to process reality, are unable to weigh harms and benefits, and thus cannot 
consent to the procedure.362  On the other hand, simply because consent cannot be 
                                                                
356Id. 
357Id. 
358It does not follow that the physician always must act in accordance with patient’s 
wishes, though.  A patient may desire an intervention that does not satisfy the “no harm” 
analysis.  In other words, a physician is not required to perform a procedure simply because 
the patient so desires, but is required to abstain from performing it if the patient refuses it. 
359See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION POLICY COMPENDIUM, Informed Consent, 
(Opinion of Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, E-8.08, 1981). 
360Certain antipsychotics can cause tardive dyskenesia, a permanent movement disorder.  
PHYSICIAN’S DESK REFERENCE 2535 (56th ed.) (2002). 
361Of course, neither a child, nor a person with such a low IQ score as to be considered 
incompetent, will most likely be tried.  Nor can these individuals be medicated into 
competence, so treatment questions arise only in the context of civil commitment. 
362The word “reasonably” is purposefully omitted.  Just because a person makes a decision 
that given all the information available is “unreasonable” (e.g., refusing a blood transfusion 
when such transfusion is medically necessary) does not automatically mean that a person 
could not understand the information.  Only a person who cannot understand the information 
should be deemed unable to give or withhold consent; not merely a person who makes 
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obtained, it does not follow that no treatment should be provided.  When a person 
cannot consent, a judgment must be made based on twin concepts of “best interest of 
the patient”363 and patient’s own values, if known.364  When the physician is unaware 
of the patient’s wishes, it has to be presumed that the patient would wish to be 
treated if such treatment comports with the “no harm” standard.   
 There is a caveat that must not go unaddressed.  Whenever not treating an 
individual threatens harm to the society at large, the individual’s rights deserve less 
deference than in a situation where society’s interests365 are not so threatened.366  
Thus, a person afflicted with tuberculosis has a right to be untreated on the condition 
that he is isolated from the rest of society.  Similarly, a mentally ill patient who may 
be dangerous to himself or others, in principle retains his right to remain free of 
treatment if an alternative method of preventing harm to himself or society exists.  
However, if no alternative is present, a person must be treated to the point where the 
threat to himself or society is eliminated.  However, once that point is reached, or an 
alternative is found, even if the person is not completely “cured,” he regains his 
unqualified right to choose the scope and the amount of treatment for himself. 
3.  The “Professionalism” Principle 
When one thinks of the Hippocratic Oath, one traditionally thinks of its 
proscription on causing harm.367  However, the Oath also demands that a physician 
be loyal to his profession and that he keep his art pure.368  Thus, whenever practicing 
medicine, a physician owes not only certain duties to his patient, but also a duty to 
his profession.  Of course part of this “professional duty” is the requirement that the 
physician act in the best interest of the patient (according to the principles outline 
                                                          
decisions different from those that a “reasonable man” would make under similar 
circumstances.   
363When a patient’s values/wishes are known, these wishes must be considered to be in the 
patient’s “best interests” when the patient’s values/wishes are not known, the choice that 
another person (possibly the physician himself, if there are no relatives or others close to the 
patient to consult with) would make in a similar situation for himself become what would be 
in the patient’s “best interests.”  It is of course preferable that the physician try to elucidate 
whenever possible the wishes and values of the patient in question, instead of making a 
decision on his own. 
364See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) (holding that when a person cannot give 
consent a substitute judgment that takes account of the best interests of the patient must be 
used); see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (holding that patient’s own wishes if 
expressed while competent should predominate when making substituted judgment). 
365This determination is not to be made by a physician, but by appropriate regulatory 
agencies.  These agencies can institute reporting requirements for infectious disease, and then 
deal with the situation if the individual refuses treatment. 
366Saying that individual’s rights are diminished does not mean, ipso facto, that he must 
undergo treatment.  Rather, it is an observation that when an individual presents a threat to 
society, he is faced with a choice of being treated or being put in such situation where he 
cannot threaten others.  The choice nonetheless is his.   
367See supra text accompanying note 339. 
368STEADMAN’S MED. DICTIONARY 799 (26th ed.) (1995) (text of Hippocratic Oath, “I will 
preserve the purity of my life and my art.”). 
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above), but that is not the whole of physician’s responsibilities.  He is also 
responsible for making sure that his actions, even if consonant with principles of “no 
harm” and “consent” are not harmful to the profession of medicine as a whole.  That 
is not to say that in order to benefit the art and science of medicine one may harm a 
patient, but merely to say that prior to engaging in any action, a physician must 
consider both the effect on a given patient and the effect on the profession of 
medicine.   
An objection to this principle can be raised along the lines that following the 
dictate of “professionalism” is no different from balancing harms to the patient 
against the harms to the society, an approach already rejected in this article.369  Yet, 
this criticism is unwarranted.  Unlike balancing patient’s harms and benefits against 
that of the society, this principle does not call for the diminishing of the patient’s 
central role in the risk-benefit analysis.  Instead, this principle comes into play only 
when the “no harm” and “consent” principles have been satisfied.   
Thus, a physician must first satisfy himself that no harm will come to the patient.  
If he cannot do so, the other two tests become irrelevant, for he should not take any 
action.  If he can so satisfy himself, he must then proceed to elicit the patient’s 
consent for the proposed action (subject to limitations outlined in Part V.A.2).  
Again, if the consent is denied, the physician must stop.  If the consent is granted, the 
physician can proceed, but only insofar as the proposed actions will not reflect 
poorly on his profession. 
As Part III mentions,370 not all actions currently taken by psychiatrists are rooted 
in hard science.  Aside from such questionable techniques as offering opinions based 
on nothing more than hypothetical questions propounded by counsel for either 
side,371 psychiatrists also engage in actions for which they are simply not trained.  
Among them are predictions of future dangerousness,372 and testifying on “test 
questions,” which are nothing more than legal and moral conclusions.373  Not being 
experts on the field, yet offering opinions on the matter, psychiatrists diminish their 
profession and bring it into disrepute.  Because moral outlook (and thus testimony on 
issues of morality) by definition cannot be grounded in science, psychiatrist who do 
so testify practically invite opposing testimony.  The “battle of the experts” that 
                                                                
369See Part V.A.1. 
370See supra, accompanying notes 131-34; see also HAGEN, supra note 139. 
371LAFAVE, supra, note 8, at 378; see also supra text accompanying note 133. 
372The American Psychiatric Association, for example, condemned this practice, stating 
that “[t]he ability of psychiatrists or any other professionals to reliably predict future violence 
is unproved.”  AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT 
INDIVIDUAL 30 (1974).  Studies have shown that psychiatrists are right in their predictions 
roughly 1/3 of the time, an abysmal record by any standards (after all, pure guessing would 
produce right answers roughly 50% of the time).  The false positive rate was even higher, 
80%.  See JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL 
TECHNIQUES 64-67 (1981).  Despite these studies, psychiatrists continue to give and courts 
continue to use such testimony.  See Mark David Albertson, Can Violence Be Predicted? 
Future Dangerousness: The Testimony of Experts in Capital Cases, 3-WTR CRIM. JUST. 18, 19 
(1989). 
373LAFAVE, supra, note 8, at 378; see also State v. McCann, 47 S.W.2d 95 (Mo. 1932). 
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results often causes juries to discount psychiatric testimony altogether,374 and 
diminishes the respect that the public holds for the profession. 
B.  Application of Principles 
Bearing the above principles in mind one can review the participation of 
psychiatrists in the criminal justice system at points outlined in Part III, supra, a 
propos of these rules.   
1.  Competency to Stand Trial or for Execution 
In evaluating the defendant prior to the beginning of trial so as to verify his 
mental state, the psychiatrists serves an essential medical function, one practiced by 
physicians the world over, namely assessing the patient.  It is irrelevant who employs 
the physician, because as stated before, a physician “acting in a capacity that requires 
a psychiatrist's education, judgment, and experience is, in that role, practicing 
psychiatry,”375 and thus owes the primary duty of allegiance to the patient and not the 
employer.  The potential conflict arises not in the actual evaluation,376 but in 
submitting a report to the court detailing the findings.  If the report is adverse to the 
defendant, an extra-clinical harm ensues, i.e., the defendant is brought to trial with 
the potential for conviction and incarceration.377  On the other hand, if the report is 
favorable to the defendant, an extra-clinical harm ensues from the likely committal to 
a psychiatric institution with the attendant potential clinical harms from any 
medication that may be administered.  Of course, with a favorable report, the 
defendant also enjoys the benefits (though perhaps temporary) of escaping criminal 
responsibility and/or punishment.  At the very least, when the report is favorable to 
the defendant, harms are counter-balanced (though not necessarily outweighed) by 
the benefits.  When the report is not favorable however, no such balancing occurs, 
and thus a psychiatrist causes more harm than good and becomes directly responsible 
for such harm. 
Because a psychiatrist does not know a priori which way the competency report 
is going to come out, he runs the risk of placing himself in a situation where he 
would behave in an unethical manner.  However, it cannot be that a psychiatrist can 
only be allowed to submit his report when such a report is beneficial to the patient.  
Another solution to this dilemma must exist.  This solution must also close the door 
to the tendency of the courts to use psychiatric testimony at the competency stage as 
a justification to deal with the defendant in a way that they would have done anyway.  
Psychiatrists should not give in to the temptation to justify the decision of the courts, 
and should confine themselves to the proper medical function, i.e., evaluating a 
                                                                
374See Sundby, supra, note 82; see also State v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306 (Conn. 1987); 
Montano v. State, 468 N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. 1984); Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 
1984); Commonwealth v. Tyson, 402 A.2d 995 (Pa. 1979); see also supra text accompanying 
note 187. 
375Rothstein, supra, note 338. 
376One assumes that during the evaluation a psychiatrist is acting professionally, and that 
he is practicing good psychiatry. 
377Although this section speaks in terms of competency to stand trial, everything said 
applies with equal if not greater force to the situation where competency to be executed is at 
issue.    
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patient and providing medical information elicited from such evaluations for the 
court.  Of course, a psychiatrist still cannot know a priori what medical information 
he will elicit from the patient exam, nor the way in which the court will treat the 
information.  However, a psychiatrist can safely say that there are no identifiable 
harms that come from the examination itself, thus satisfying the first condition of 
ethical behavior.378  Second, a psychiatrist has the patient’s consent for evaluation (or 
consent of someone standing in the stead of a presumably incompetent individual).  
However, that consent can only extend to the area within the psychiatrist’s expertise.  
A psychiatrist can no more be presumed to have patient’s consent to render legal 
opinions (and “competency” is a legal not medical matter), than he can be presumed 
to have patient’s consent to invest in a stock market. 
By solely engaging in a diagnostic procedure without drawing any legal 
conclusions therefrom, a psychiatrist escapes causing harm to the patient, and does 
not act beyond the scope of the consent.  Whatever harm does result becomes 
attenuated by having been interpreted by and processed through the legal machinery. 
One might ask how this solution is different from what occurs today.  After all, a 
psychiatrist’s report as to competency is not final; the final decision still remains 
with the court even under today’s rules.  The difference lies in the fact that today’s 
rules allow the psychiatrist to pass on questions concerning the ultimate question,379 
i.e., is the defendant’s mental health such that he cannot understand the charges 
against him or effectively assist in his own defense.  Although the courts do have to 
pass the final judgment on the matter, they most often defer to the “expert” 
testimony.380  The court-appointed psychiatrist for all intents and purposes becomes 
the final judge in determining whether the defendant will enter the criminal justice 
system,381 and in that role he may end up behaving unethically in those cases where 
his determination causes harm without corresponding benefit to the patient.  Being a 
“final judge” is medically unethical because it causes an identifiable harm to the 
patient, that is not balanced by any particular benefit, and because the psychiatrist is 
acting beyond his expertise and therefore, beyond the scope of consent. 
Even assuming that the psychiatrist does have the patient’s explicit consent to 
speak on moral issues, he should not do so, because it violates the “professionalism” 
principle.  By testifying on issues of morality (presumably at patient’s request), the 
psychiatrist invites opposing testimony from psychiatrist with different moral 
precepts.  There will then be testimony cloaked in the legitimacy of the white coat, 
yet having nothing to do with either art or the science of medicine.  Of course, lay 
populace may still feel resentful towards psychiatrists for “getting the defendant off,” 
much in the same way that the feel resentment for attorneys who defend unpopular 
clients or causes.  However, so long as psychiatrists do not stray from practicing 
                                                                
378Because no harm come from the evaluation itself, a psychiatrist is not obligated to 
completely withdraw from the process.  As any other physician, he can observe the patient, 
and share his observations with others (within the legal limits of the patient’s right to 
confidentiality). 
379See supra notes 175-188 and accompanying text. 
380The expert testifying for the defendant is usually given more credence by the court than 
the prosecution expert.  See LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 372; Weihofen, supra note 13, at 967-
68. 
381Id. 
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medicine, i.e., from diagnosing and describing the diagnosis, such resentment will be 
minimal.  In any case, whatever resentment there may be, it is inconsequential, for 
the science of medicine cannot be brought into disrepute simply because the legal 
profession chooses to use certain medical diagnosis as an exculpatory or mitigating 
factors.  
The proposed solution would allow a psychiatrist to do nothing more than to 
document an illness from which the defendant may be suffering.  In his report the 
psychiatrist would be allowed to list defendant’s symptoms and diagnosis, as well as 
common patterns of behavior or problems exhibited by people with this diagnosis.  
He would also be allowed to state whether a given defendant encountered some, all 
or none of these problems.  In other words, in court, the psychiatrist would act no 
differently than in a clinical setting where he would present the patient’s case to a 
team of other psychiatrists.  The court would then be presented with nothing more 
than medical testimony and would have to make its own judgment as to what to do 
with the defendant without using the “expert” testimony as a fig leaf.  A psychiatrist, 
on the other hand, is spared venturing into potentially unethical terrain. 
2.  Testimony at Trial 
The problem at a competency hearing is that the court generally relies on the 
court-appointed “independent” expert, and such expert does not know a priori 
whether his actions will cause more harm or more good, nor can he even make a 
good faith estimate on the issue, because he cannot properly valuate the harms.  
(That is markedly different from a physician embarking on a course of treatment that 
he is not sure will benefit his patient, for such physician at the very least has to have 
a good faith belief that the actions he takes are for the patient’s overall physiologic 
benefit.)  This problem is not present at trial when the issue of sanity at the time of 
the offense is litigated.  The expert knows quite well what he is expected to testify to, 
simply based on who has hired him, and thus is aware of the patient’s relative values 
of harms and benefits.382  This of course is not to suggest that experts sell their 
testimony for money; nonetheless, it is clear that if an expert hired by either side 
does not confirm their theory, such expert will not be asked to testify.    
Accordingly, the literal interpretation of the “no harm” principle would hold that 
psychiatrists testifying for the defense act ethically (because no harm comes from 
evaluation, and they act within the scope of the consent given, and consonant with 
the patient’s value rankings when actually testifying), while those testifying for the 
prosecution do not (because they do not act consonant with the patient’s value-
rankings).  This outcome cannot be right as a matter of policy calling for adversarial 
judicial process, where either side can use its experts to rebut the findings of experts 
for the other side.  As a matter of ethics, however, it may very well be right.  When a 
psychiatrist ventures onto the field of morals (and as discussed previously, Part II, 
supra, sanity is a matter of moral judgment)383 he cannot claim the balance required 
in the legal system as a shield for his own actions; his actions must only be guided by 
the ethics of medicine, and not by any desires of the legal system.  For that reason, 
                                                                
382If the psychiatrist is hired by the defense, he may assume that prison ranks lower than 
an NGRI acquittal on the defendant’s value-preference scale.  If the psychiatrist is hired by the 
prosecution, he too is aware of the same value-scale, yet acts contrary to it.   
383See supra notes 16-17 and the accompanying text. 
212 JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH [Vol. 17:169 
when a psychiatrist chooses to testify for the prosecution, i.e., when he knowingly 
assists the state in its attempt to exercise its punitive power, he acts contrary to 
medical ethics. 
It thus seems that good policy is in direct conflict with medical ethics so long as 
the current system is in place.  However, by taking the approach enunciated in Part 
V.B.1, supra, i.e., limiting psychiatric testimony only to diagnosis and description of 
a recognized illness, the ethical quandary is avoided.384  Diagnosis is a 
quintessentially medical function.  Furthermore, medical diagnosis is grounded in 
science that can be agreed to by psychiatrists working for either the defense or the 
prosecution, while criminal responsibility is grounded in morals, and therefore 
susceptible to much broader disagreements.  By simply adducing defendant’s 
diagnosis (if any) into evidence, the psychiatrist does not directly help the state 
exercise its penal functions, for any decision as to how to interpret or how much 
weight to give to the defendant’s diagnosis vis-à-vis his moral culpability remains 
the sole province of the court and the jury.  By not drawing moral conclusions or 
answering “test questions,” psychiatrists keep themselves away from the ethical 
morass of helping the state incarcerate or execute someone.    
3.  Actions of “Independent Panels”  
This article has dedicated significant time and space to the discussion of an 
“independent panel” system of psychiatric involvement in the adjudicatory process.  
That discussion was to lay the groundwork for the argument that the ethical problems 
encountered by psychiatrists in the criminal justice system are not dependent on the 
adversarial system or the “battle of the experts;”385 rather they result from the close 
involvement of psychiatrist in the criminal justice system.  The Soviet system 
provided for an independent panel of experts to evaluate a defendant and pronounce 
his fitness to stand trial or his fitness to be held liable for his actions.  Even though 
the psychiatrists technically were not there to help the state incarcerate individuals, 
given the fact that their decisions were rarely questioned, they exercised inordinate 
authority over the lives of human beings.  The presence of that excess authority led 
to the numerous abuses of psychiatry.   
Some may argue that it was the repressive Communist state that caused 
psychiatric abuses and not the vesting of power in the medical profession, but that 
argument is fallacious.  The case of Colonel Budanov arose well after the collapse of 
                                                                
384Alternatively, it can be argued that while the psychiatrist for the prosecution cannot 
testify on moral issues under the “no harm” principle, the psychiatrist for the defense cannot 
testify on these issues under the “professionalism” principle.  (Of course, the prosecution’s 
psychiatrist is also constrained by the “professionalism” principle, but there is no need to 
reach it as the “no harm” principle comes first). 
385There is a separate problem with the “battle of the experts,” namely that such spectacles 
demean medicine as a profession because they suggest that there is no objective truth or 
criteria in the field of psychiatry.  A corollary of the above problem is disillusioned juries 
ignoring psychiatric testimony altogether, thus defeating the very purpose behind “expert 
witnesses.”  See Part III, supra.  Thus, “battles of the experts,” especially on issues that are not 
grounded in medical science are to be avoided on the “professionalism” principle.  They may 
be avoided by using independent panels, but it is by no means the only way, and certainly not 
an acceptable one, if not coupled with the limitations on testimony previously discussed in this 
article. 
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the USSR, yet psychiatrists in that case were afforded significant opportunity to have 
the surrounding events and the political situation in the country influence their 
judgment.  Granted, today’s Russia is still far from the democratic ideals espoused 
by the United States; nonetheless, even in the United States, if given a completely 
free hand psychiatrists are likely to have their world outlook, current events and 
political persuasions color their judgment.  It is at this point, when a psychiatrist 
overlays his own values onto a diagnosis, he perverts the medical nature of his 
involvement into a political and/or penological tool.  Such behavior is contrary to 
medical ethics, specifically, the principles of “no harm” and “professionalism,” and 
should be guarded against.  The solution to this problem is the one already discussed 
in the previous two subsections.  With this solution adopted, a psychiatrist can only 
diagnose disease and his ability to impose his own values on that diagnosis is 
extremely limited.  The problem of the Soviet-type system is solved not with cross-
examination (although that too is highly useful and valuable) but limiting the range 
of testimony that psychiatrists can offer, thus shielding them from potentially 
unethical practices. 
4.  Medicating the Prisoners 
Psychiatrists often have to medicate prisoners in order to maintain their mental 
health.  The majority of such treatment is done with the defendant’s consent and with 
no other purpose than to alleviate pain.  These instances are fully consonant with the 
consent principle.  However, as discussed is Part III, supra, there are instances when 
an incompetent person is medicated with the eye to make him competent to stand 
trial or be executed.  The ethicist encounters two problems in this situation.  One, if a 
person is incompetent and/or insane, and medicating him will restore his competence 
and/or sanity, a cognizable clinical benefit has been achieved, yet this benefit is 
balanced by an extra-clinical harm.  The harm can be starkly defined, as in 
execution, or more amorphous, as in standing trial which may or may not result in 
punishment of varying severity.  Second, because the person is incompetent, he 
cannot grant or withhold consent.386  Nor is relying on “the best interest of the 
patient” likely to provide any helpful guidance, for in order to define “best interests,” 
one would need to balance harms and benefits, thus running into the problem of 
valuation and balancing already described.387  Faced with this predicament, a 
psychiatrist could simply decide to do what the legal system dictates, but such action 
would assume that what is legal is necessarily moral, hardly a self-evident 
proposition.   
A middle ground is then perhaps the best and the only solution.  A psychiatrist 
cannot allow himself to be the direct cause of death (or for that matter other punitive 
measures visited upon the prisoner).  Thus, medicating someone solely for the 
purpose of restoring competence (be it for execution, trial, etc.) is wholly improper 
                                                                
386An individual incompetent to stand trial may be competent to refuse medication, but in 
that case the dilemma is easier because consent can be given or withheld.  The issue here is 
what to do with those incompetent to stand trial (be executed) and give consent to medical 
treatment. 
387See Part V.A.2. 
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on the grounds of the “no harm” principle.388  It also violates the “consent” principle, 
as admittedly the purpose of medication is not to follow the patient’s wishes, but 
simply to restore a legal status of competence.  Yet, a psychiatrist cannot refuse to 
medicate a person on death row if a person wants to continue medication simply 
because such actions will keep that person competent and thus liable to be executed.  
This is so because a psychiatrist has to maintain his responsibility to the condemned 
as a patient, despite the fact that this patient is scheduled for execution.  A 
physician’s responsibility has to be uniform regardless of the patient’s status in the 
criminal justice system.  This responsibility is not a sliding scale where duty is 
inversely proportional to the level of restriction society has imposed on individual’s 
freedom.  Thus, the mere prospect of execution does not make psychiatric help 
unethical, any more than the fact of incarceration makes such help unethical.  The 
dilemma must be resolved by resorting to patient’s (prisoner’s) own wishes.  So long 
as the patient is informed of the consequences of his decisions, whether they result in 
the death penalty being applied, or in the prisoner languishing in a state of perpetual 
incompetence, or in any other outcome, the patient’s wishes should be honored.  In 
so doing, a psychiatrist acts within the canon of medical ethics. 
The problem however, is that an incompetent inmate cannot consent to treatment.  
On the other hand, medicating such an individual cannot be said to be against his 
will, as the person does not have free will as a result of his own incompetence.389  
Since medicating such an individual is likely to bring clinical relief without causing 
immediate death, it is then ethical for a psychiatrist to medicate such individual to 
competence.  With restoration to competence, free will returns, and at that point, the 
prisoner may refuse further medication by exercising his free will and refusing to 
give his consent for further medication.   
Operating under the principle of consent, a psychiatrist should then cease 
medicating the individual.  Of course, once medication ceases, the prisoner is likely 
to revert back to the pre-medication condition, and it would be rather futile to have 
this process repeat ad infinitum.  Fortuitously, no need for such repetition exists, for 
once the prisoner reverts back to incompetence, the psychiatrist must be guided by 
the principle of respecting patient’s wishes previously expressed.   
By acting according to the above scheme a psychiatrist maintains his duty to treat 
the ill, yet avoids being the instrument of death or other penal interests of the state.  
If the prisoner, after being restored to competence, judges that the harms of further 
treatment outweigh the benefits, he is free to cease treatment and thus bring to a halt 
all legal proceedings that the state has pending against him.   
The main objection to this proposal will be the perception that some criminals 
will manipulate the system in such a way as to escape punishment.  This article will 
not quarrel with this notion, but will provide an answer to the charge.  Society has 
                                                                
388AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION POLICY COMPENDIUM, Capital Punishment (Opinion 
of Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, E-2.06, 1980, updated 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 
1999, 2000). 
389Of course the doctor is not the one who should be making the decision, but rather a 
guardian for that patient.  The guardian often is the state, whose interests may be contrary to 
the patient’s (e.g., execution).  A physician nonetheless can medicate such a patient provided 
that death is not an immediate result of such medication.  A physician may medicate the 
patient only to a point where the patient can decide for himself whether or not to continue with 
the treatment. 
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settled on the belief that the insane and incompetent are not fit for punishment.  So 
long as this moral idea persists, society must live with the result that some people 
whom it would otherwise like to punish will be able to escape condemnation.  Much 
like the society is willing to tolerate criminals taking refuge in the Fourth or Fifth 
Amendment to escape punishment no matter how strong the evidence of guilt is, so 
too must society accept the notion that so long as reprieve from punishment is 
available to the insane, some people would take refuge in it, even if they could be 
medicated out of their condition. 
5.  Treating the Acquitted 
The same approach that was suggested towards prisoners should be taken 
towards the acquitted, for after all, those committed to psychiatric institutions differ 
from prisoners in name only.  If the individual refuses treatment and constitutes a 
danger to himself or others, he can of course remain confined, and if he continues to 
constitute a threat even when confined, the exception to the consent principle can be 
invoked.390  It is worth noting that even if the exception to the consent principle is 
invoked, one must recognize that the benefits (both clinical and extra-clinical) from 
such involuntary medication are quite tangible, while the harms are not; after all the 
patient no longer faces the threat of punishment within the criminal justice system, as 
he has already been acquitted. 
The only additional point worth making is that psychiatrists must not let the 
judiciary dictate the methods of treatment to them.  In Part III, supra, it has been 
mentioned that courts often ignore psychiatric recommendations as to patients who 
have been deemed worthy (in the clinical sense) of release from 
institutionalization.391  While psychiatrists are powerless to challenge confinement 
orders, they cannot continue to carry out treatments that are no longer in the patient’s 
interest.  Such behavior would violate the “no harm” principle.392  Thus, 
psychiatrists, if they wish to be involved in treating the NGRI acquittees, must treat 
them no different from other patients irrespective of the judicial views on this class 
of patients.  In other words, judicial orders and power (e.g., deciding on commitment 
and release) cannot be used as a shield for psychiatrists engaging in an otherwise 
unethical behavior, i.e., acting contrary to the patient’s interests. 
6.  Competency for Execution 
A brief note must be made about psychiatric participation in execution.  This 
article outlined the parameters of proper psychiatric involvement in trial competency 
evaluations in Part V.B.1.  The argument here is that nothing changes when the 
hearing is to determine competency for execution as opposed to for trial.  Although 
                                                                
390See Part V.A.2 (stating that in situations where an individual is dangerous to society, 
and no other method to control dangerousness exists, a patient can be mediated without his 
consent.)  This is however, a rare and extreme case. 
391See supra notes 275-79 and the accompanying text. 
392The behavior also violates the “professionalism” principle, because whenever 
psychiatrists act as merely a penological tool, they demean the profession.  Although the 
“professionalism” principle is violated, as discussed above, there is no need to reach it.  See 
supra, note 382.   
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Professor Bloche argues that the death penalty is qualitatively different393 from any 
other sort of punishment, it is argued here that the difference is only quantitative, and 
therefore does not require any special ethical consideration by psychiatrist.  Whether 
a psychiatrist testifies in a setting of execution competency hearing, or pre-
sentencing hearing, or pre-trial competency hearing, legal consequences (of one sort 
or another) flow from such testimony.  These legal consequences may be harmful to 
the individual about whose condition the testimony is being proffered.  However, a 
psychiatrist is not in a position to evaluate these harms because he has no specialized 
training for doing so.  Again, even if the patient consents to these harms, a 
psychiatrist must guard against unprofessional behavior.   
The key therefore is to put as much of a distance as possible between physician’s 
testimony and legal consequences of whatever sort, and to require a psychiatrist to 
act within the scope of the consent given him,394 and within the scope of his 
professional expertise.395  This can be accomplished by the psychiatrist (regardless of 
who employs him) being no more than a physician to a given patient.  He can 
therefore discuss the patient’s medical condition but may not draw legal conclusions 
as to competency or “understanding.” In short, in this setting, psychiatrist’s duties to 
his patient are neither increased nor diminished, and he must act consistent with the 
principle of “no [medical] harm” and patient’s consent. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Insanity and criminal justice have been linked for over 2,000 years, and the 
involvement of psychiatrists in the criminal justice system both in this country and 
abroad is here to stay.  However, such involvement is fraught with ethical perils and 
can push a medical professional beyond the realm of treatment and cure and into the 
realm of punishment and execution.  Such behavior is not consistent with the exalted 
role that the healers hold in society and tarnishes their role and image.  What began 
as a noble attempt to have judges and juries render their verdicts on the basis of 
scientific evidence has too often deteriorated into psychiatrists being active 
participants in the state penal system.  Such intertwining of two completely 
incompatible systems cannot continue if the ethics of the medical profession are to 
be maintained.  In order to maintain the benefits of scientific information being 
available to the courts while upholding the principles of medical ethics, psychiatrists 
need to limit their involvement solely to scientifically verifiable information and act 
in the same way towards inmates that they would towards any other patient.  With 
this approach there is yet a possibility that the high ethical standards demanded of 
healers will remain intact. 
                                                                
393See Bloche, supra note 126, at 323-37; see also Richard J.  Bonnie, The Death Penalty: 
When Doctors Must Say No, 305 BRIT. MED. J. 381 (1982); Richard J. Bonnie, Healing-Killing 
Conflicts: Medical Ethics and the Death Penalty, 20 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12, 13 (1990). 
394See Part V.B.1. 
395Id. 
